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Introduction 
 
 
 The question of whether one can rationally demonstrate the world’s temporal 
beginning was a source of considerable controversy among medieval thinkers. Access to 
more of Aristotle’s works around 1200 largely occasioned the controversy,1 since one 
typically interpreted Aristotle as arguing for an eternal world, although the exact mind of 
the Stagirite was itself not always clear to medieval thinkers.2 Although there were 
numerous issues at stake in the debate, one especially interesting aspect of the discussion 
concerned the question of whether genuine philosophical reasoning could arrive at a 
conclusion inimical to divinely revealed truth. Since nearly all medieval European 
philosophers and theologians were Christians, they held the doctrine that the world exists 
after not existing as a divinely revealed truth, enunciated by Sacred Scripture and defined 
by the Fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215. Nevertheless, some argued that a 
philosopher, qua philosopher, could hold that the world is eternal, and yet qua Christian 
adhere to the faith. These thinkers believed that Parisian masters working in the Faculty 
of Arts should enjoy a healthy measure of autonomy from those working in the Faculty of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J. Wippel notes that until shortly after the death of Abelard, medieval scholars had access only to a 
portion of Aristotle’s works in Latin translation. These works, which included the De interpretatione and 
the Categories, were collectively known as the Logica vetus (see John Wippel, Medieval Reactions to the 
Encounter between Faith and Reason [Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, 1994], 8-10). 
2 At In II Sent., d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2, Bonaventure rehearses four putatively demonstrative arguments of 
2 At In II Sent., d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2, Bonaventure rehearses four putatively demonstrative arguments of 
Aristotle for an eternal world, drawn almost entirely from the Physics. Yet in the same question, he notes 
that many moderni interpret Aristotle to mean only that the world did not begin from natural causes 
(Bonaventure, In secundum librum Sententiarum [Quaracchi: Ex typographia Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1885], 
22-23. http://archive.org/stream/doctorisseraphic02bona#page/n9/mode/2up). L. Bianchi attributes 
Bonaventure’s uncertainty regarding Aristotle’s position to the immature state of Aristotle scholarship 
when Bonaventure was working on his Sentences commentary. The next fifteen years saw great strides in 
exegesis of Aristotle’s texts. Thereafter, his doctrine of the eternity of the world could no longer be seen as 
a minor lapse in Aristotle’s judgment, but rather as a constitutive element of his system (Luca Bianchi, 
L’errore di Aristotele: La polemica contro l’eternita’del mondo nel XIII secolo [Firenze: La Nuova Italia: 
1984], 29). Although fourteenth century thinkers, e.g. Peter Auriol and William of Alnwick, often devoted 
an article of their respective questions on the eternity of the world to determining the opinion of Aristotle, 
by 1300 no one was in serious doubt about Aristotle’s view of the matter.  
	   4	  
Theology. One such Arts master, Boethius of Dacia, presents the autonomy of philosophy 
vis-à-vis theology as follows: 
Whatever the natural philosopher denies or concedes as a natural philosopher, this 
he denies or concedes from natural causes and principles. Wherefore the 
conclusion wherein the natural philosopher asserts that the world and the first 
motion did [not] begin to be is false when it is taken without qualification; but if it 
is referred back to the arguments and principles from which the natural 
philosopher derives it, if follows from these.3      
 
For Boethius, any science is limited by its principles. The theologian, the philosopher, the 
natural scientist, and the mathematician arrive at conclusions only on the basis of the 
principles of their respective sciences. Boethius distinguishes between asserting 
something to be the case simpliciter, and asserting it according to the perspective of one’s 
discipline. While as a Christian Boethius professed that the world began in time, qua 
philosopher reasoning from strictly natural principles he concluded that the world was 
eternal. Boethius takes the philosopher to be justified in holding to a position he knows is 
false in an absolute sense.4 
 Opposed to the Aristotelians in the Parisian Arts Faculty was a conservative 
contingent in the Theology Faculty, represented by figures like Henry of Ghent (d.1293). 
Henry was a major force leading to Bishop Etienne Tempier’s condemnation in 1277 of 
certain propositions (including some that affirmed the possibility of a world from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Boethius of Dacia, On the Eternity of the World, trans. John F. Wippel (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Medieval Studies, 1987), 52.  
4 The position of Thomas Aquinas relative to a possible eternal creation is akin to that of Boethius of Dacia. 
For Aquinas, it is impossible philosophically to demonstrate either that the world existed from eternity, or 
that it began in time. Reasoning from natural principles only, one can conclude only that either is possible. 
The theologian’s task is only to show that no argument for the eternity of the world is demonstrative. 
Aquinas’ disussion of the issue has the advantage over Boethius’ that it does not does require the natural 
philosopher, even qua natural philosopher, to deny the world’s temporal beginning. As Wippel notes, when 
Boethius says that a natural philosopher, qua natural philosopher, must deny conclusions that destroy his 
science, e.g. “God created the world in time”, he prescribes a methodology that affords philosophy greater 
autonomy, but at the expense of undercutting the certainty of philosophical conclusions (John F. Wippel, 
Medieval Reactions to Encounters between Faith and Reason, 69-70). For Aquinas’ treatment of the 
question, see Thomas de Aquino, De aeternitate mundi in Opera Omnia 43 (Rome: Editori San Tommaso, 
1976), 85-89.  
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eternity) associated with thinkers like Boethius of Dacia and Thomas Aquinas. Henry 
addresses the question of a possible world from eternity in q. 7-8 of his Quodlibet I, a text 
based almost certainly on a disputation at Paris in December of 1276.5 Although Henry 
makes several arguments claiming to prove that a world from eternity is impossible, in 
this project I focus on the decades-long impact of one, namely his argument that if the 
world exists from eternity, God caused it necessarily.6 Briefly, Henry argues as follows: 
when something is, it exists necessarily, i.e. something cannot both be and not be at the 
same time and in the same respect. Further, after a thing has come to be, it cannot be 
made not to have been, since not even God can change the past. Thus a thing’s existence 
can only be impeded in a moment that precedes its existence. However, if the world has 
existed from eternity, there never was such a preceding moment, and so neither was there 
a moment in which God could have freely chosen to create the world.7 
 The Augustinian hermit Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358) saw that no argument on 
behalf of the possibility of a world from eternity could be convincing without defeating 
Henry’s “necessary creation argument.” Moreover, Gregory made original and important 
contributions to medieval debates concerning the composition of continua and whether 
God can change the past. In what follows I will argue that Gregory’s views on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, ed. R. Macken (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), xvii-xviii.   
6 Henry notes that it was the teaching of the philosophers, e.g. Avicenna, that God created the world 
necessarily. Commenting on a passage from Avicenna’s Metaphysics (VI, 2) Henry says, “Quod aliquid 
(inquit) sit causa existendi causatum, cum prius non fuit, hoc contingit quia non est causa eius per suam 
essentiam, sed per aliquam determinatam comparationem quam habet ad illud, cuius comparationis causa 
est motus. Cum igitur (ut dicit) aliqua ex rebus per suam essentiam fuerit causa esse alterius rei, profecto 
semper erit causa quamdiu habuerit esse, eo quod absolute prohibet rem non esse. Et haec est intentio 
quae apud sapientes vocatur creatio. Et sic posuerunt philosophi illi quod Deum esse causam creaturae non 
sit voluntatis dispositione sed necessitate naturae” (Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q. 7-8, 29).  
7 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q.7-8, 40-41. Although before Henry no medieval author dealt with 
this argument, proponents of the possibility of an eternal world had their ways of arguing that an eternal 
creation is compatible with divine freedom. For example, Thomas Aquinas argues that, since God does not 
deliberate, there is no reason why creation necessarily temporally follows God’s will to create (Thomas de 
Aquino, De aeternitate mundi, 87).    
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composition of continua and God’s omnipotence allowed him to answer Henry of 
Ghent’s necessary creation argument against the eternity of the world. In this way 
Gregory supported the growing autonomy of philosophical thinking vis-à-vis theological 
principles in the fourteenth century.   
 The thesis has three chapters. In chapter one, I will establish the importance of 
Henry’s necessary creation argument by examining its significance for two of Gregory’s 
fourteenth-century predecessors, the Franciscans Peter Auriol and William of Ockham. In 
virtue of Henry’s argument, Auriol concludes that a world from eternity is impossible. 
On the other hand, although Ockham agrees with Henry that if the world has always 
been, God created it necessarily, he nevertheless perseveres in the opinion that the world 
could have been from eternity. In chapter two, I will explain how Gregory’s innovative 
account of the composition of continua helps him answer Auriol’s denial of the 
possibility of a world from eternity. Finally, in chapter three, I will discuss Gregory’s 
view that God’s omnipotence extends as far as being able to undo the past, and the 
relevance of that view for the question of a possible world from eternity. As I hope to 
show, Gregory’s view that God can undo the past permits him to fill a gap left by 
Ockham: unlike Ockham, Gregory offered a philosophical account for the possibility of a 
world from eternity that safeguarded God’s freedom in creating.   
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Chapter One – The Context of Gregory’s Question on the Eternity of the World: 
Peter Auriol and William of Ockham 
 
Grasping the significance of Gregory of Rimini’s contribution to the eternity of 
the world debate requires that we examine the context of what he said. In the first chapter 
of this work, I will discuss the contributions of two Franciscans who wrote in the first 
half of the fourteenth century, and with whose works Gregory was familiar: Peter Auriol 
(d. 1322), and William of Ockham (d. 1347). These two authors reveal a bit of what was 
being said in Paris and Oxford in the first half of the fourteenth century about the 
possibility of a world from eternity. Significantly for our study of Gregory, both highlight 
the momentous influence Henry of Ghent exerted on the eternity of the world debate in 
that period, especially through his argument that if the world exists from eternity, it exists 
of necessity. Moreover, both Auriol’s and Ockham’s treatments of the eternity of the 
world show they appreciated the force of their opponents’ arguments. For example, 
though Auriol finally concludes that a world from eternity is impossible, he shows that 
some traditional arguments for that conclusion are incorrect.8 Similarly, though Ockham 
sees no logical contradiction in the view that an eternal world is possible, he agrees with 
Henry of Ghent that if the world has always been, its existence is absolutely necessary. In 
this way he risks running afoul of the doctrine of God’s freedom in creating, a risk with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For instance, a typical argument for the necessity of the world’s temporal beginning concerned the fact 
that God and the world are not consubstantial. Henry of Ghent took that view. For him, since a creature is 
of itself a non-being, it does not have being the way the Son among the divine Persons has being from the 
Father. Instead, because a creature only has participated being, it exists after not existing (Henricus de 
Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q.7-8, 36). On this score, Auriol disagrees with Henry. Borrowing an argument from 
Augustine, Auriol says that if, contrary to fact, fire were eternal, its radiance would be eternal too. In other 
words, an effect that isn’t consubstantial with its (created) cause, but which the cause produces 
instantaneously, is coeternal with the cause. If this holds between a created effect and created cause, and 
God is more powerful than any created thing, then God can produce an effect of a different substance and 
yet coeternal with himself (Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum super librum secundum Sententiarum [Roma, 1605]), 
d.1, q.1, a.2, 14-15).   
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which he is obviously uncomfortable. In chapter one, I will first discuss Peter Auriol’s 
question on the eternity of the world. I will highlight that for Auriol a world from eternity 
is impossible, for God’s freedom in creating demands that creation occurred in an instant.  
 
I. Peter Auriol 
The Franciscan Peter Auriol, the Doctor facundus, read the Sentences in Paris in 
the years 1316-1318.9 Auriol examines the question of a possible world from eternity in 
his Scriptum super secundum librum Sententiarum, d.1, q.1, a.1-3. In the first article he 
asks whether it was Aristotle’s opinion that the world has in fact been produced from 
eternity. Since my project focuses on what some medieval figures thought about the 
eternity of the world, and not on how they interpreted Aristotle, I will not attend to 
Auriol’s first article. Article two asks whether something produced freely and 
contingently can be produced from eternity. Finally, Auriol concludes the question by 
considering whether it can be demonstrated that when the world began, it was as it is 
now, i.e. full of species and perfect from its parts. Gregory of Rimini studied Auriol’s 
question closely10, and in the first section of chapter one I will report features of Auriol’s 
discussion that later will help us appreciate the importance of Gregory’s views. I intend 
to show that Auriol’s question on a possible eternal creation raises three questions for 
Gregory: First, and most importantly, “Did God necessarily produce the world in an 
instant?” Second, “Does a world from eternity imply that a part is greater than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Friedman, Russell L. “Peter Auriol.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 1997-. 
Article published September 10, 2009. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/auriol/. 
10 For example, above (n.9) we indicated Auriol’s view that the impossibility of a world from eternity does 
not derive from the world being of a different substance than God. In his question on the eternity of the 
world (Lectura super secundum, d.1, q.3, a.1, 106-107), Gregory’s views regarding the coeternality of 
different substances correspond largely to Auriol’s and he quotes Auriol almost verbatim in a few places in 
that passage.          
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whole?” And third, “Does a world from eternity imply that an actual infinity of days has 
been traversed?”   
To begin, Auriol’s discussion of a possible world from eternity gives evidence of 
the long shadow Henry of Ghent cast over the whole subsequent debate. As I mentioned 
in the introduction, Henry’s most important objection to a possible world from eternity 
was his view that, if God created the world from eternity, he created it necessarily.11 For 
Auriol, Henry’s argument presents the principal difficulty for the view that God could 
have freely created the world from eternity. He rehearses Henry’s argument as follows: 
The point and difficulty of the question consists in this, that what is or has been 
from eternity was unable not to be. For if it was able not to be, I ask in what 
instant. Not in a prior instant, because there is no instant before eternity; nor in an 
instant when it is, because it is a contradiction for something not to be in the 
instant when it is, because it would simultaneously be and not be; nor in an instant 
after it has been, because it was unable not to have been at least from eternity, and 
thus it was unable not to have been produced; but after it was produced, it was 
unable not to be, although it is. And then it follows that it was not produced freely 
and by choice.12   
  
In what follows, I intend to show that Auriol agrees with Henry because Auriol thinks 
that creation necessarily occurred in an instant. Moreover, if Auriol is correct in that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Perhaps it has already occurred to the reader to ask himself why Henry of Ghent et al. think the supposed 
connection between a world from eternity and the world’s necessity tells against the possibility of the 
former. The answer concerns in what respects medieval theologians regarded God as necessitated, and in 
what respects they thought of him as free. To mention one important example, Thomas Aquinas holds that 
since God’s goodness is the proper object of God’s will, God necessarily wills himself. Thus God cannot 
will not to be Triune – God simply is a Trinity of Persons and he necessarily wills himself to be Three-in-
One. Yet, since God is eternally and supremely blessed in himself, vis-à-vis creatures God’s will is 
absolutely free (Summa theologica I, q.19, a.3). Thus the necessary creation argument derives its force 
from the view (accepted by all medieval Christian thinkers I know) that vis-à-vis creatures God can do 
anything that does not entail a contradiction. For Henry of Ghent, any affirmation implying that God, in his 
dealings with creatures, necessarily does x, must be false.  
12 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum super II Sent., d.1, q.1, a.2, 12-13: “Punctus quaestionis et difficultas consistit 
in hoc, quod illud, quod est vel fuit ab aetrno non potuit non esse. Si enim potuit non esse, quaero in quo 
instanti. Non in priori, quia nullum instans est prius aeternitate; nec in instanti in quo est, quia contradictio 
est, quod aliud non sit in instanti in quo est, quia simul esset et non esset; nec in instanti postquam habuit 
esse, quia ad minus ab aeterno non potuisset non esse, et sic non potuisset non produci, sed postquam 
productum fuit non potuit non esse, et si hoc sit, tunc sequitur quod non producebatur libere et elective.”  
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regard, it follows that the world necessarily began with some first being whose beginning 
was measured by the first instant. However, if there existed a first being whose 
production was measured by a first instant, then it is impossible for the world to be from 
eternity.    
Consider what Auriol says in the following argument: “No production of a 
creature measured by a passing instant can be eternal; but every production of a creature, 
from the force whereby it is the production of a creature, is measured by a passing 
instant, therefore…”13 To prove the major premise, i.e. that no production measured by a 
passing instant is eternal, Auriol says that if the world was produced in a passing instant, 
and  
If [that instant] was in act, therefore, the time which follows that instant has a 
beginning; since it is necessary that if an earlier instant has passed, and if it was in 
act, it was not continuous with the time preceding and following. For an instant 
that is continuous with the time preceding and following is not in act, but only in 
potency…and though something can be preserved in continuous time from 
eternity, nevertheless it cannot be produced, because production was measured by 
a passing instant in act, and because the instant could not actually be the end of 
preceding time and the beginning of the time following; therefore, an earlier time 
necessarily preceded [it]; therefore, that instant was not from eternity; therefore 
neither was the production.14   
 
This text requires some unpacking. Most important is Auriol’s point that a past instant, 
when it was in act, existed discretely, i.e. it was continuous neither with the instant that 
preceded it nor with the instant that followed. Any past instant existed only when the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., 15: “Nulla productio creaturae mensurata instanti transeunte potest esse aeterna; sed omnis 
productio creaturae, ex vi, qua est productio creaturae, habet, quod mensuretur instanti transeunte, ergo.”  
14 Ibid.: “Maior videtur esse evidens, ex quo enim ponitur instans transiens, si fuit in actu, ergo tempus 
quod sequitur instans illud habet initium, quia necesse est quod si prius instans transivit, et si fuit in actu, 
quod non fuit continuativum temporis praecedentis et sequentis. Instans enim quod continuat tempus 
praecedens et sequens non est in actu, sed tantum in potentia…licet et aliquid posset esse manutentum ab 
aeterno tempore continuo, non tamen productum, quia productio mensurabatur instanti in actu transeunte, 
et quia instans erat in actu non poterat esse finis temporis praecedentis et initium sequentis; ergo necessario 
praecedebat tempus prius; ergo instans illud non fuerat ab aeterno; ergo nec productio.” 
	   11	  
preceding instant had ceased to be and when the following instant still existed only in 
potency. Applying this view of time to the question of a possible world from eternity, 
Auriol can say that if the world was produced in an instant that is now past, that instant 
was continuous neither with a previous instant (for that instant had already ceased to be), 
nor with a subsequent instant (for that instant wasn’t yet). Because an instant is not of a 
piece with preceding time or with the time to come, if God produced the world in an 
instant, then the world’s production is temporally finite both a parte ante, and a parte 
post.        
Of course, that point is useful for Auriol’s purposes only if he can show the minor 
premise is true, i.e. that the world was in fact produced in a passing instant. Significantly 
for our purposes, it’s in this portion of the argument that Auriol’s agreement with Henry 
really comes to the fore. To prove the minor premise, Auriol argues that the force behind 
the initial production of a creature has limited effect. In fact, the power that propels a 
creature into existence cannot sustain it beyond its initial instant, for  “if a creature’s 
production were able to last from its own force, thus there would be no need of 
conservation…but this response is impossible, because the [creature’s] production would 
be necessary, and the product could not be annihilated.”15 In this passage, Auriol asks us 
to imagine a world in which creatures, in virtue of their production, could subsist beyond 
the instant of their production without being maintained in being. In other words, beings 
would endure after their production even without God conserving them. In this imaginary 
world existence would be similar to the motion of objects in outer space: as a propelled 
object moves indefinitely through a zero-gravity space at the same speed and on the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid.: “Quia si productio creaturae haberet, quod posset ex vi sua durare, sic quod non indigeret 
manutenentia…sed responsio est impossibilis, quia ex hoc videtur, quod productio illa esset necesse esse, et 
quod productum non posset annihilari.”  
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trajectory, so the force of beings’ production (vis productionis) would sustain them in 
existence during subsequent instants.  
Auriol regards this imaginary world as impossible since he thinks God’s freedom 
requires that creatures exist beyond the moment of their production only if God conserves 
them. As the passage quoted in the previous paragraph shows, for Auriol the continuing 
existence of creatures from the force of their production would limit God’s freedom, 
because it would render God powerless to annihilate creatures after their production. 
Since even God cannot create and destroy a being at the same time, a creature is 
conditionally necessary in the instant of its production.16 If the force of production 
sustains a being subsequent to its production, it would continue to exist necessarily. Thus 
God, the source of the vis productionis, isn’t free to destroy the creature after he 
produced it, for that would amount to God’s working at cross-purposes with himself. 
Auriol distinguishes between God’s production of a creature and his maintaining the 
same creature, because the distinction guarantees God’s freedom to destroy what he 
earlier created. Auriol concludes that the imaginary scenario in which beings continue to 
exist by the force of their production is impossible. Creatures last after their production 
only if God maintains them. For our purposes and for Auriol’s, affirming God’s freedom 
in this way means that creation lasts only for an instant, i.e. the first instant of a being’s 
existence, and thus could not be from eternity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 A little earlier in article two, in the course of explaining why God may create the world from eternity, 
and yet freely, Auriol says that one may consider the affirmation, “When an agent acts, it can also not act”, 
either in sensu diviso or in sensu composito. In the “divided sense” the affirmation is true, insofar as when 
an agent X, provided he is under no compulsion, posits an act A, he could have not have posited A. Yet the 
same affirmation is false if taken in the “composite sense”, since when X posits A, he cannot 
simultaneously not posit A, since this would run afoul of the principal of non-contradiction (Ibid., 13).       
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As we’ve seen, then, Auriol argues that God’s freedom vis-à-vis creatures 
requires that the vis productionis causes creatures to exist only for a single instant. 
Production occurs in an instant. Further, since a passing instant lacks duration, creatures’ 
production by God cannot be from eternity. According to Auriol, that God created freely 
necessarily means he created the world in a first instant before which there was nothing. 
Finally, then, we’re in a position to see why Auriol agrees with Henry of Ghent: God was 
not free both to create and not to create while he created. Thus if one, believing God acts 
as a free cause, conceives of creation as occurring in an instant, he reasonably asks about 
an instant in which God was free to create or not to create. However, as Henry argues, 
there was no such instant if the world was created from eternity: not before eternity, since 
there was no such “before”; nor in the instant God created, since something cannot both 
be and not be at the same time; nor after God created, since God cannot change the past. 
As Gregory will show, however, one problem with the argumentation of Henry and 
Auriol is its starting point: in fact, there is no reason to insist that God produced the world 
in an instant, and therefore, neither is there reason to posit an instant prior to creation in 
order to safeguard the truth of God’s freedom in creating. Attempting to prove that the 
world could not have been eternal, Henry and Auriol assume the very thing that is in 
dispute, namely that creation began in an instant. As I hope to show in chapter two, 
Gregory will critique Henry’s and Auriol’s starting point on the basis of his view that 
spatial continua (magnitudes) and temporal continua are composed of an actual infinity of 
parts. If time is composed of infinite proportional parts, and not of successive indivisible 
instants, then Auriol is incorrect when he asserts that divine freedom in creating demands 
creation lasted only for an instant.17   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Those familiar with Auriol’s thought will notice that what he says in the Scriptum about creation 
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This point affords us a further sneak preview of Gregory’s argumentation. As I’ve 
tried to show, the basis of Auriol’s agreement with Henry is the former’s view that 
creation necessarily occurred in an instant. But perhaps one may take Auriol’s argument a 
step further: if creation necessarily occurred in an indivisible instant, then there 
necessarily was a first creature, since time is the measure of beings’ movement. The first 
instant measures the existence of a first creature. Further, if there was a first creature, the 
world wasn’t eternal. If a first man began to exist at a first instant, then between the first 
man and the men who now exist there have necessarily been finite men. This follows, 
since between the first instant and the current instant there are a finite number of instants, 
such that even if a new man were produced in each instant, there would still be finite 
men. In other words, the existence of a first man in the succession of men implies that the 
world necessarily had a temporal start. However, as I will try to show in chapter two, part 
of Gregory’s discussion of the possibility of a world from eternity will answer precisely 
this concern. As we’ll see, Gregory will field an objection that since there was necessarily 
a first creature, e.g. a first horse, there necessarily have been finite horses. Moreover, I 
will attempt to show that along with Gregory’s de facto answer, i.e. that there is nothing 
contradictory about an infinite succession of individual horses created in an infinite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
necessarily occurring in an instant seems inconsistent with his overall account of time. We’ve seen that 
Auriol’s argument against the possibility of a world from eternity succeeds only if the instant in which God 
created the world is indivisible. On the other hand, as Chris Schabel points out, Auriol does not subscribe to 
an atomist theory of time (Chris Schabel, “Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol’s Sentences 
Commentary,” Vivarium 38 [2000]: 120). Moreover, in the Scriptum (II, d.2, q.1, a.1) Auriol defines time 
as a continuum. He opposes the view that since time is numbered, and nothing discrete (in this case, 
number) can be intrinsic to a continuum, time cannot be a continuum. For Auriol, time is materially a 
continuum, i.e. the succession of motion. Time is divided only formally, i.e. when the soul numbers the 
succession of motion from without, separating stretches of the continuum into years, weeks, days, etc. In 
other words, for Auriol time is composed of discrete units only inasmuch as it exists in the soul that 
numbers motion. But if the division of motion into units occurs only subjectively in the soul, how can 
Auriol insist that creation necessarily occurs in an instant? His argument against the possibility of a world 
from eternity implies that instants exist extra animam, with the result that a creature’s continuous existence 
after its first instant requires that God conserve it. For Auriol’s account of time, see his Scriptum super II 
Sent., d.2, q.1, a.1-5.      
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succession of instants, Gregory’s account of the composition of continua provides 
additional reasons for thinking that creation did not necessarily include a first creature or 
a first instant. In this way Gregory helps us see that Auriol and Henry are incorrect.  
In article three of his question, Peter Auriol makes a couple additional arguments 
Gregory will have to answer to demonstrate the possibility of an eternal world. In article 
three, he asks whether it can be demonstrated that when the world began, it was as it is 
now is, i.e. full of species and complete from its parts. In his view, though one cannot 
demonstrate a priori that the world began perfect and full of species, one can demonstrate 
it a posteriori, i.e. from the inconvenientia that arise from the contrary view.18 Two of 
Auriol’s inconvenientia are important for our purposes. The first regards the view that all 
infinities are equal. If the world has existed from eternity as it now is, then unequal 
infinities would have resulted. Specifically, though the sun’s orbit around the earth is 
greater than the moon’s orbit, both the moon and the sun would have circulated the earth 
an infinite number of times, with the result that both would have covered an infinite 
distance. Presumably, the sun would have covered a greater distance, since its orbit is 
larger; but this is impossible, since one infinite distance cannot be greater than another. 
Thus the part, i.e. the distance covered by the moon in infinite time, would be equal to the 
whole, i.e. the distance covered by the sun in the same infinite time. However, since a 
part cannot equal the whole, the world with its current features, i.e. heavenly bodies 
circulating the earth in different orbits, could not have existed from eternity.19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum super II Sent., d.1., q.1, a.3, 16: “Nunc probo, quod mundum isto modo 
incaepisse possit demonstrari phylosophice a posteriori per inconvenientia manifesta, quae reputo 
impossibile evadere…” 
19 Ibid.: “Secundum inconveniens est de infinitis circulationibus, ex quo sequitur, quod tot erunt 
circulationes Solis, quot Lunae; quia utriusque infinitae, et sic pars aequabitur toti…” 
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Another inconveniens Auriol derives from the hypothesis of a world from eternity 
is the possibility that a continuum would be actually divided.20 Making sense of Auriol’s 
point here requires we recall how in VIII Physics Aristotle answers a question about 
whether its possible to traverse an infinite number of temporal points. Aristotle writes  
In a sense it is and in a sense it is not. If the units are actual, it is not possible; if 
they are potential, it is possible. For in the course of a continuous motion the 
traveller has traversed an infinite number of units in an accidental sense but not in 
an unqualified sense; for though it is an accidental characteristic of the distance to 
be an infinite number of half-distances, it is different in essence and being.21 
 
For Aristotle, a temporal continuum is composed of potentially (but not actually) infinite 
points. Continuous motion through time demands that time is continuous. If there had 
actually been an infinite number of “nows” between the moment I was born and my tenth 
birthday, I would never have reached that age, as it would have required me to traverse an 
actual infinity, which is impossible. Since the potentially infinite nows between any two 
nows are actually only when the one analyzing time counts them, it is possible to move 
continuously through time.  Auriol’s worry above is that, if the world has been from 
eternity, i.e. if infinite days have passed, then the temporal continuum is no longer only 
potentially infinite, but has become actually infinite. For Auriol, unlike the potential 
infinity that never becomes an actual infinity, a world from eternity implies an actually 
infinite number of past days, and he notes that Aristotle’s own principles show us this is 
impossible.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid.: “Aliud inconveniens est, quia possibile esset quod continuum esset actu divisum.”   
21 Aristotle, Physics in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 439.   
22 Anneliese Maier explains that for Auriol, an actual infinity is impossible, since created infinities have a 
successive character. Commenting on Auriol’s position, she writes, “Die Seinsform des Unendlichen ist 
darum immer eine Mischung von Akt und Potenz, wie bei der Bewegung. Diese Wesensbestimmung soll 
ganz allgemein für das Unendliche in jeder Form gelten, nicht nur für die fortschreitende Addition der 
Zahlenreihe oder der Teilungsprozess des Kontinuum…sondern auch für die simultane Unendlichkeit” 
(Anneliese Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert: Studien zur Naturphilosophie der 
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 In sum, from Auriol’s discussion, three questions emerge that will later occupy 
Gregory of Rimini: first, does creation necessarily occur in an instant? Second, are all 
infinities equal? And third, is a temporal continuum composed of an actual infinity of 
parts? For Gregory to demonstrate the possibility of a world from eternity, he’ll have to 
find ways to answer all three questions differently than Auriol. As I’ll aim to show in 
chapter two, Gregory’s account of the composition of magnitudes and temporal continua 
permits him to give innovative answers to all three questions, and thus argue 
convincingly that a world from eternity is possible.   
  
II. William of Ockham 
  
Our discussion of Peter Auriol’s question concerning a possible world from 
eternity highlighted the influence Henry of Ghent exerted on that debate in the early 
decades of the fourteenth century. William of Ockham penned his disputed question 
Utrum mundus potuit fuisse ab aeterno per potentiam divinam a few years later than 
Auriol’s question,23 and Henry shaped Ockham’s thinking regarding this issue as much as 
he did Auriol’s.  Ockham’s question is odd, for despite the philosophical strength of his 
argumentation, he contents himself with a modest conclusion, namely that one may 
reasonably adhere either to the possibility or to the impossibility of a world from eternity, 
and that one cannot sufficiently disprove either view.24 One may wonder why Ockham 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Spätscholastik [Rome: Edizioni di “Storia e Letteratura,” 1949], 202). In other words, Auriol accepts the 
possibility only of an infinitum in fieri and denies that of an infinitum in facto esse. 
23 Richard C. Dales thinks that Ockham authored this question sometime between 1319 and 1324, when he 
departed Oxford for Avignon (Richard C. Dales, Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World 
[Leiden: E.J. Bril, 1990] 222).  
24 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, ed. Girardus I. Etzkorn, Franciscus E. Kelley, et Josephus 
C. Wey in Guillelmi de Ockham: Opera Philosophica et Theologica: Opera Theologica VIII (St. 
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does not make the stronger claim his argumentation seems to warrant, namely that an 
eternal creation is possible (period!). In this section of chapter one, I will argue that 
Ockham accepts Henry’s view that a world from eternity is incompatible with the 
doctrine of God’s freedom in creating. Ockham distinguishes himself from Henry, 
however, in that he does not for that reason reject the possibility of a world from eternity. 
Unlike Henry and Auriol he approaches the question of an eternal creation primarily as a 
philosopher. However, Ockham the theologian recognizes, à la Boethius of Dacia, that 
his philosophical conclusions must leave room for faith. So instead of asserting that the 
world could have existed from eternity through God’s power, Ockham concludes that the 
question remains open. Nevertheless, his inability to find a philosophical reason to 
preclude an eternal world causes him to lean to the view that an eternal world is 
possible.25  
First, to show the strength of Ockham’s argumentation on behalf of the possibility 
of a world from eternity, let’s examine two famously difficult arguments purporting to 
demonstrate that a world from eternity is impossible. After stating that one may 
reasonably hold either that the world could have been from eternity by God’s power, or 
that such was impossible, Ockham rehearses four arguments “that prove that it could not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), q.3, 59: “Dico quod utraque pars potest teneri et 
neutra potest sufficienter improbari.” Notice that this position is actually weaker than what Thomas 
Aquinas had proposed nearly about fifty years earlier: For Aquinas, the eternity of the world cannot be 
philosophically demonstrated or disproved. For Ockham, the possibility of an eternal world cannot be 
philosophically demonstrated or disproved.   
25 Ockham recognizes no “manifest contradiction” in this view, and thinks God is able to do whatever does 
not violate the principle of non-contradiction. For example, he writes, “Quia tamen non videtur includere 
manifestam contradictionem mundum fuisse ab aeterno…” (Ibid.). And again, after rehearsing a number of 
Henry’s rationes contra, Ockham says, “Sed istis rationibus non obstantibus, videtur quod nulla sit 
manifesta contradictio creaturam fuisse ab aeterno nec repugnantia, nec ex parte Dei, nec ex parte 
creaturae…Et ita dico quod si Deus potest facere quidquid non includit contradictionem, potuit fecisse 
mundum ab aeterno (Ibid., 67-68).    
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have been from eternity,” and “which seem to conclude more that the others.”26 For 
example, the second of the arguments contends that, if there have been an infinite number 
of celestial revolutions, since for every celestial revolution God could have created a 
human being endowed with an immortal soul, there now could be an infinite multitude of 
rational souls. But an actual infinity is impossible; therefore, the world could not have 
been from eternity.27 Opponents of a possible world from eternity, especially leading 
Franciscans like St. Bonaventure28 and John Pecham29, had long used this argument 
against their opponents, who typically held Aristotle in high regard. In the late thirteenth 
and early fourteenth centuries this argument had occasioned great consternation among 
the partisans of a possible world from eternity, especially Thomas Aquinas and his 
Dominican successors, e.g. William Peter de Godino and James of Metz.30 In contrast, 
the implication of an infinite multitude of souls doesn’t bother Ockham at all. He is 
happy to concede that, if the world had been from eternity, there would now be an infinite 
number of souls in act. For Ockham, it’s only important to affirm that God would remain 
the only infinitely perfect being, since infinite souls do not form a unity among 
themselves.31   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., 59-60.   
27 Ibid., 60-61.  
28 Bonaventure, In secundum librum Sententiarum, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, 21-22, 23.  
29 John Pecham, Questions Concerning the Eternity of the World, ed. V. Potter (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1993), 27. 
30 Although Aquinas, in his opuscule De aeternitate mundi, dismisses many arguments purporting to 
demonstrate the impossibility of a world from eternity as unworthy of serious consideration, he calls this 
one “rather difficult” (difficilior). In the same work Aquinas tries to avoid the implication of an actual 
infinity of souls by arguing that God could have created a world without human beings from eternity, and 
fashioned human beings at some later moment. Godino and Metz, not satisfied with Aquinas’ solution, 
attempted to evade the argument by other stratagems (for more on what early Dominicans had to say about 
the eternity of the world, see John W. Peck, SJ and Chris Schabel, “James of Metz and the Dominican 
Tradition on the Eternity of the World, ca. 1300,” Medioevo 41 (forthcoming).   
31 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 68. As Dales notes, thinkers in the tradition of 
Bonaventure tried to strengthen the “infinite souls argument” by claiming that an infinite multitude of souls 
would possess infinite power, which is impossible (Richard C. Dales, “Henry of Harclay on the Infinite,” 
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 Another of the arguments Ockham rehearses claims that if the world has been 
from eternity, then a part of the temporal continuum would be greater than the whole. 
This argument is similar to an argument we already encountered in Auriol, but the 
version Ockham rehearses is longer and bears more clearly the mark of its progenitor, 
John Pecham. The argument goes like this: let a be the whole of past time up to the 
beginning of today. Next, b is the whole of future time from the beginning of today. Let c 
be the whole past time before the end of today, and d be the whole future time from the 
end of today. Now, if the world is eternal, a and b are equal, and c and d are equal. 
Further, b is greater than d, since future time from the beginning of today is greater than 
future time from the end of today. Thus, as b is greater than d, and a and b are equal, a is 
also greater than d. Moreover, if c and d are equal, then a is greater than c. However, a 
must also be a part of c, since the whole past time before the start of today belongs to the 
whole past time before the end of today. But since c is equal to d, and b is greater than d, 
the equality of a and b implies that a is greater than c, i.e. the whole of past time up to the 
beginning of today is greater than the whole past time before the end of today. Thus, if 
the world is from eternity, a part is greater than the whole to which is belongs. Since this 
is inconveniens, it is impossible for the world to be from eternity.32  
John Pecham, in the tradition of Bonaventure33, was the first to propose this 
argument.34 As we saw earlier, Peter Auriol regarded a similar argument as convincing.35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Journal of the History of Ideas 45 [1984], 297). By indicating that infinite souls would not form a unity 
among themselves (and thus would not possess infinite perfection), Ockham’s reply to the objection 
appears aimed at thinkers in that tradition.   
32 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 62-64. 
33 The part-whole argument is an elaboration of Bonaventure’s argument that the world cannot be from 
eternity since it is impossible to add to the infinite (In II Sent., d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2). According to Pecham, et. 
al., if the world is from eternity then c = eternity + 1 day. Since it is impossible to add to the infinite, the 
world cannot be from eternity.     
34 John Pecham, Questions concerning the Eternity of the World, q.2, 26-27. 
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Scotus answers it by claiming that while “equal”, “greater”, and “less” apply only to 
finite quantities, the argument posits that the world has existed through infinite time. For 
Scotus, since it makes no sense to compare infinities, it is false to say that a would be 
greater than c.36 It’s tempting to follow Scotus and dismiss the argument as premised on a 
category mistake. Yet, the argument’s subsequent history finds Scotus’ reply excessively 
quick and facile.37 The argument also appears in Henry of Harclay.38 Harclay’s reply is 
considerably stronger than that of Scotus. Simply put, Harclay denies that all infinities 
are equal, which means that, in the part-whole argument, a and c may be unequal, and yet 
both infinite. To prove his point, Harclay reduces to absurdity the view that all infinities 
are equal: since there are more numbers that exceed 2 than exceed 100, and numbers 
extend to infinity, the infinity of numbers exceeding 2 is greater than the infinity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum super II Sent., d.1., q.1, a.3, 16. Auriol’s argument concerns the respective 
revolutions of the moon and the sun, and concludes that if the world were eternal, a part would equal the 
whole (in Ockham’s version, the part is greater than the whole). But both version are premised on the 
equality of infinities.  
36 Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d.1-3 in Opera Omnia VII (Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis: Vatican City, 
1973), d.1, q.3, 87.  
37 For example, Auriol, obviously countering Scotus’ reply to the part-whole argument, says that the ratio 
quantitatis belongs especially to the infinite. One may presume that Auriol reasons as follows: since 
infinite quantities are so great, and quantities are either equal or unequal to one another, infinite quantities, 
even more than finite quantities, are properly equal or unequal (Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum super II Sent., 
d.1., q.1, a.3, 16).     
38 Richard C. Dales, “Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio ‘Utrum mundus potuit fuisse ab aeterno’,” Archives 
d’Histoire Doctinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 50 (1983): 242. Interestingly, in the critical edition of 
Ockham’s question (p.62, n.8), the editors attribute the following remark about the part-whole argument to 
Harclay: “Videtur mihi quod potest probari demonstrative, licet videtur aliis quod ratio est sophistica. Ego 
tamen nullam responsionem possum videre, nec potero in aeternum ut credo.” This remark, which one 
finds in Dales’ critical edition of Harclay’s question, does not refer to Pecham’s part-whole argument; 
instead, it refers to an argument Harclay makes to show just the opposite, namely that the infinite can be 
exceeded in the direction in which it is infinite. Harclay observes that if the world were from eternity, the 
sun would precede every father-son pair, individually and collectively. Thus, even if there have been 
infinite fathers generating infinite sons, their infinite past duration would nevertheless be exceeded by the 
sun’s “more infinite” past duration (Dales, “Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio ‘Utrum mundus potuit fuisse ab 
aeterno’,” 248).	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numbers that exceeds 100. Otherwise, one has to claim that all numbers equal 2, which is 
absurd.39  
As with the argument concerning infinite souls, Ockham denies that the part-
whole argument gives us reason to deny the possibility of a world from eternity. 
Essentially, he adopts the argumentation of Harclay. Like Harclay, he argues that 
infinities are not all equal. For example, if the world is eternal, though the sun and the 
moon have each made infinite revolutions around the earth, the moon’s revolutions are 
“more infinite” than the sun’s revolutions, since its orbit is smaller.40 On the other hand, 
the part-whole argument presumes the equality of infinities, e.g. of a and b, and of c and 
d. Since a key premise of the part-whole argument is false, a’s being greater than c gives 
us no reason to conclude that a world from eternity is impossible.41 In sum, as with the 
infinite souls argument, Ockham deals easily with what the rest of the Franciscan 
tradition regarded as a convincing argument against the possibility of a world from 
eternity.   
 It’s puzzling that despite diffusing the power of two notoriously difficult 
arguments, Ockham manages to conclude only that regarding the possibility of a world 
from eternity, either view may be held and neither disproved. He sees no reason why one 
must deny the possibility of an eternal creation on the basis of the “infinite souls 
argument”, which for decades had frustrated notable proponents of a possible eternal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Dales, “Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio ‘Utrum mundus potuit fuisse ab aeterno’,” 245-246.  
40 Aquinas and Harclay provide the basis for this assertion by showing that, just as there may be a 
proportionality between a finite and an infinity, or a proportion between two finites, so there may be a 
proportion between two infinities. For example, as 8 is double of 4, so infinite 8s are double of infinite 4s 
(Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate, q.2, a.3, ad 4; Dales, “Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio ‘Utrum 
mundus potuit fuisse ab aeterno’,” 247). Concerning the infinite revolutions of the moon and the sun, since 
the proportion of the moon’s revolutions to the sun’s revolutions is 12 to 1 (at least according to medieval 
cosmology!), if the world has been from eternity, the proprtion of the moon’s revoltions to the sun’s 
revolutions would be infinite 12s to infinite 1s.      
41 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 80-81. 
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world like Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, he considers himself to have answered 
satisfactorily the part-whole argument, which was a favorite of the (mostly Franciscan) 
opposition to a possible eternal world. So why does he offer a conclusion far more timid 
than the one Aquinas had reached decades earlier?   
 To answer this question, let’s examine how Ockham treats some of Henry of 
Ghent’s arguments against the eternity of the word, especially his famous “necessary 
creation argument” that was so important for Auriol. When one reads Ockham’s 
discussion of Henry’s arguments, it’s not immediately apparent that Henry exerts any 
special influence on Ockham’s thinking regarding the eternity of the world. In fact, 
Ockham seems to handle Henry’s arguments as capably as he did the earlier ones. For 
example, the first of Henry’s arguments rehearsed by Ockham is as follows: a creature by 
itself and by its own nature is a non-being. Hence, another produces it, not only as to its 
factum esse, but also as to its fieri. In other words, a creature is not simultaneous with the 
Creator the way light is with the sun.42 Therefore, a creature’s non-being really precedes 
its being, and not only in the intellect or by nature. Further, since the act of creation is 
indivisible, lacking duration both a parte ante and a parte post, it cannot be from 
eternity.43        
Ockham shows that this argument fails in two respects. First, he points out that if 
a creature were a non-being by nature, then no power could make it a being. Actually, 
when some authors call a creature a non-ens de se, they mean to say only that, unlike 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Already before Henry of Ghent, those who argued on behalf of a possible world from eternity claimed 
that it is possible for the world always to have been made (factum esse) without ever first becoming (fieri). 
Most notably, Aquinas says, “God is a cause producing his effect, not through motion, but instantaneously; 
therefore, it is not necessary that he preceed his effect in duration” (Thomas de Aquino, De aeternitate 
mundi, 86). For Aquinas, since God does not change or deliberate, it is possible (though not necessary) that 
God created the world such that the world has always been. In that case, God is responsible only for the 
world’s factum esse, since the world never first became (fieri).  
43 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 64-65.  
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God, it does not belong to the nature of a creature to exist.44 Second, Henry’s argument 
falls short inasmuch as it posits a necessary distinction between creation and 
conservation. For Ockham, this distinction relies on the notion of creation that belongs to 
Christian Revelation, which teaches that the world exists only after first not existing. In 
fact, one who holds that the world exists from eternity does not distinguish creation from 
conservation, fieri and factum esse.45 While for Christians “creation” signifies that the 
negation of the thing produced really preceded the thing’s existence46, one who does not 
reason from revealed principles may define “creation” as “the total production of 
something by its efficient cause.”47 In that case, creation is not an event measured by a 
first indivisible instant; rather, things are created in each moment of their existence, “thus 
you are now created by God.”48          
  But now we proceed to Ockham’s discussion of Henry’s most important 
argument, i.e. that a world from eternity implies a necessary creation. As we’ll see, 
though that argument doesn’t compel Ockham to reject the possibility of a world from 
eternity, he agrees that a world from eternity is incompatible with God’s freedom. The 
first step in Ockham’s discussion is to correct Henry’s reporting of what Aristotle says at 
Perihermenias I, 9 (19a23-24). In his first quodlibetal question, Henry reports that 
Aristotle says, “A being that is, when it is, is necessary.”49 Ockham, in contrast, indicates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid., 82: “Patet enim quod haec est falsa ‘creatura est non-ens secundum naturam suam,’ quia si sic, per 
nullam potentiam posset fieri ens. Et si aliqui auctores dicant quod creatura est non-ens de se, dico quod per 
tales affirmativas intelligunt negativas, scilicet quod creatura secundum naturam suam non est ens nec 
habet esse, etc.”  
45 Ibid., 84-85. 
46 Ibid., 85-86. 
47 Ibid., 85.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q.7-8, 40: “Secundum Philosophum esse quod est, quando est, 
necessario est.” When Ockham rehearses Henry’s argument, he places the following quote of Aristotle on 
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that Aristotle says the necessary proposition is rather “Everything that is, is when it is.”50 
He then goes on to explain that the truth of such a temporal proposition requires the truth 
of both its parts for the same time the proposition is said to be true. For example, the 
proposition, “When Socrates is, he is necessary”, is false, since the second part of the 
proposition is false relative to any creature. For Ockham, the proposition, “When x is, x is 
necessary”, is true only if x is God, since the clauses “God is” and “God is necessarily” 
are both true for the same time, i.e. always.51 
 Next comes a key step for understanding Ockham’s agreement with Henry that if 
the world is eternal, God created it necessarily. Ockham answers an objection from 
Scotus. The objection argues that the proposition, “Everything that is, when it is, is 
necessary,” is conditionally necessary, though not absolutely necessary.52 In other words, 
although no creature is necessary simpliciter, when a creature is, i.e. on the condition that 
it is, it is necessarily by conditional necessity. If the objection succeeds, then one could 
hold that God retains his freedom in creating even in the event that the world has always 
existed. According to the objection, if the world were eternal, it would not be necessary 
absolute et simpliciter, but only on the condition that God wills it to be.53 Ockham rejects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Henry’s lips: “Secundum Philosophum, omne quod est quando est necesse est esse (Guillelmus de 
Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 66).  
50 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 87. 
51 Ibid., 88-89.  
52 Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d.1, q.3, 79-80.  
53 This solution has a long history among those who favored the possibility of a world from eternity but 
wanted to safeguard the doctrine of God’s freedom. As far as I’m aware, Godfrey of Fontaines was the first 
to answer Henry’s argument by distinguishing between what is necessary absolute et simpliciter and what 
is necessary only condicionata (Godfrey of Fontaines, Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de 
Fontaines, ed. M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer, Institut Supèrieur de Philosophie de L’Université, Louvain 1904 
(Les Philosophes Belges, Texts et Études, 2), 76-77]. Following him in this opinion were the Dominicans 
John of Paris (see Jean de Paris, Commentaire sur Les Sentences. Livre II [ed. J.P. Muller, Pontificium 
Institutum S. Anselmi, Rome 1964 (Studia Anselmiana Philosophica Theologica Edita a professoribus 
Instituti Pontificii S. Anselmi de Urbe, 12)], 28), William Peter de Godino, and James of Metz. For the 
questions of Godino and Metz, see Schabel’s critical editions in Peck, SJ and Schabel, “James of Metz and 
the Dominican Tradition,” Appendices I & II.    
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this view, however, on the grounds that it does not conform to the rules of logic, which 
dictate that every necessary proposition is absolutely necessary. For Ockham, there is no 
such thing as a proposition that is necessary by a merely conditioned necessity; rather 
there are two distinct types of absolutely necessary propositions, namely conditional (or 
temporal) and categorical.54 Ockham’s point is that a necessary proposition that includes 
a conditional is no less necessary than one lacking a conditional. Take the proposition 
“When Socrates is, Socrates is.” Admittedly, when Socrates is, he is a contingent being. 
His existence depends on God causing him. Nevertheless, whether or not Socrates is, the 
proposition “When Socrates is, Socrates is” is every bit as necessarily true as the 
proposition “God is good and wise.” Though God is necessary and Socrates is contingent, 
neither proposition can ever be false. As Ockham says, “Neither in the instant Socrates is, 
nor earlier, nor later is there potency to the contrary, namely that the conditional ‘If 
Socrates is, Socrates is,’ would be false, because it can never be false.”55 Therefore, there 
is no way to safeguard divine freedom by positing “conditional necessity.” 
 Next, Ockham’s hypothetical opponent, perhaps not grasping what Ockham has 
just argued, objects that if Socrates exists in instant a, his existence then is necessary in a, 
since he cannot both be and not be at the same time. Nevertheless, in a Socrates is only 
conditionally, and not absolutely necessary. Moreover, though in a Socrates exists 
necessarily by conditional necessity, before a it was possible for Socrates not to exist.56 
Of course, as one may anticipate, Ockham concedes all these points, since what concerns 
him here is not whether Socrates’ existence is absolutely or conditionally necessary at a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 89. As an example of an absolutely necessary 
conditional (or temporal) proposition, Ockham gives, “If [when] Socrates runs, Socrates moves”; on the 
other hand, “God is good and wise” is a absolutely necessary categorical proposition.    
55 Ibid., 90. 
56 Ibid. 
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or at any other moment. On the contrary, what is important for him is that the 
proposition, “If Socrates is, Socrates is”, can never be false, though both the antecedent 
and the consequent signify contingent states of affairs.   
 Just when one wonders if Ockham has forgotten the purpose for discussing the 
necessity of different types of propositions, he draws us back to the question of Henry of 
Ghent’s argument against the eternity of the world. Ockham concedes that, although the 
proposition, “When Socrates is, Socrates is”, is always true, before Socrates is, it is 
possible for him not to be. There is a problem, however: as Henry argued, posita 
hypothesi that the world is from eternity, there never was such a “before.” If “When x is, 
x is” is absolutely necessary, and the world has always been, then there has never been a 
moment when the affirmation, “The world exists”, has not been absolutely necessary. 
There was never an instant before the world, in which there was the possibility for the 
world not to have been. Ockham observes that all true statements about the past are 
necessarily true since the past cannot be changed.57 But in the case of the necessary truth 
of most affirmations concerning the past, e.g. “The battle of Gettysburg was fought from 
July 1-3, 1863”, there was time before the past event when there was potency for the 
event not to occur. If the world has always existed, there never was a time in which “The 
world exists” could have been false.58 Therefore, Ockham admits, if the world has been 
from eternity, then one can say God necessarily produced the world, as the Philosophers 
said, and not contingently.59            
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid., 91. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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 Perhaps one desiring to dispute my reading would point to what Ockham says two 
paragraphs later, at the very conclusion of his answer to Henry’s argument that an eternal 
world would be a necessary world. Ockham writes 
If we hold that these two things stand simultaneously, that the world is 
contingently produced by God and from eternity, then it is necessary to say, as it 
seems, that on this account the world was able not to have been in a, because 
earlier by nature or according to the understanding God was able not to have 
produced the world in a, because it was in his will to produce in a or not to 
produce.60     
 
Here Ockham suggests that, even if the world were eternal, God could still have freely 
caused it to exist in a, since God’s act of causing the world precedes the world’s 
existence, if not temporally, at least according to nature.61  
 These final lines of Ockham’s answer to Henry’s arguments strike me as  
incompatible with the whole discussion that preceded them. For one, the view that God’s 
causing the world is prior to the world “by nature or according to the intellect” is 
tantamount to saying that the world is conditionally, but not absolutely necessary. As 
we’ve observed, however, unlike the many Dominican proponents of a possible world 
from eternity, Ockham rejects the distinction between conditional and absolute necessity 
as meaningless. Moreover, Henry of Ghent’s argument is premised on the view that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid., 92: “Si teneamus quod ista stant simul quod mundus sit contingenter productus a Deo et ab aeterno, 
tunc oportet dicere, ut videtur, quod propter hoc potuit mundus non fuisse in a, quia prius natura secundum 
intellectum potuit Deus non produxisse mundum in a, quia in voluntate sua fuit producere in a vel non 
producere.”   
61 Ockham was by no means the first to suggest this. Thomas Aquinas also distinguished between an “order 
of duration” and an “order of nature” to explain how even an eternal world must have been created by God 
ex nihilo. He writes, “The term ‘after’ unquestionably connotes order. But order is of various kinds; there is 
an order of duration and an order of nature. If, therefore, the proper and the particular do not follow from 
the common and the universal, it will not be necessary, just because the creature is said to exist subsequent 
to nothingness, that it should first have been nothing, in the order of duration, and should later be 
something. It is enough that in the order of nature it is nothing before it is a being; for that which befits a 
thing in itself is naturally found in it before that which it merely has from another” (See Thomas Aquinas, 
De aeternitate mundi in St. Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure, On the Eternity of the 
World, trans. and ed. Cyril Vollert, Lottie H. Kendzierski, and Paul M. Byrne [Milwaukee, WI: Marquette 
University Press, 1964], 21-22).       
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world’s contingency depends on there having been some instant preceding the world’s 
creation. Throughout his reply, Ockham concedes the truth of that premise. For example, 
a little earlier in the discussion Ockham’s hypothetical opponent objects that, if the world 
has been from eternity, then one can say God necessarily produced the world. The 
opponent reminds Ockham that God does nothing outside himself necessarily. Ockham 
replies that, although in fact God does nothing outside himself necessarily, if one posits 
the counterfactual that the world is from eternity, then the proposition “the world has 
been from eternity” is absolutely necessary.62 Ockham wouldn’t have felt himself 
constrained to reply in this fashion if he didn’t admit Henry’s key premise. Moreover, in 
the same paragraph as his suggestion for safeguarding divine freedom, Ockham answers 
the question, “If a being exists in a, does it have potency to non-being in a or before a?” 
He replies, “If by a you mean some instant of time, then I say that before a [the world] 
was able not to exist in a. If by a you mean eternity, then I say that neither in a was the 
world able not to exist in a on account of a contradiction, nor before a, because there is 
nothing before a in reality.”63 As before, this view requires Ockham to concede Henry’s 
premise that, for something to exist contingently in some instant, there must have been a 
preceding instant in which the thing’s cause could have refrained or been impeded from 
causing it. If a is a temporal instant, e.g. 2:37pm on 13 February 2015, then the world 
was able not to be in a, since God could have annihilated the world at 2:36pm of that day. 
On the other hand, if a represents eternity, then the world has never been in potency to 
non-being, since there is nothing prior to eternity. In the final lines of his answer to 
Henry, however, Ockham seems abruptly to change his mind, and says that natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 92. 
63 Ibid.  
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priority may suffice for an agent’s freedom. If this is really Ockham’s view, one wonders 
why he spent the last several pages correcting Henry’s reporting of Aristotle, 
distinguishing among different kinds of propositions, denying the reality of so-called 
“conditioned necessity,” and explaining why creation from eternity implies that creation 
is necessary. After all, he could have avoided the need for all that argumentation had he 
just said, “Even if the world is eternal, God freely creates it since he precedes it 
naturally.” 
 Earlier I claimed that the modest conclusion of Ockham’s question is explained in 
light of his response to Henry’s “necessary creation argument.” Actually, Ockham’s 
conclusion and the way he seems to change his mind about whether God may have freely 
created the world from eternity are both explained by the fact that he approaches the 
question primarily as a philosopher. In this respect his method is very different from that 
of Henry and Auriol. Reading closely the respective texts of Henry and Auriol, one sees 
that they did not approach the question of the world’s eternity from a purely 
philosophical stance. Particularly when it comes to the “necessary creation argument”, 
their conclusions were informed by principles derived from divine Revelation. For 
example, immediately after making the argument, Henry observes  
If it is posited that [the world] always had being from God from eternity, not only 
did it never acquire being from God newly (de novo) from some beginning of 
time, but is it altogether impossible that it ever would have acquired being from 
God newly in some beginning of time. But this is simply false and impossible, 
since faith, which posits that the world was sometime made new by God, holds 
the contrary.64        
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q.7-8, 41-42: “Sic creatura mundi, si ponatur habuisse esse a Deo ab 
aeterno, non solum numquam erat ei esse acquisitum a Deo de novo ex aliquo temporis initio, sed nec 
omnino possibile est ut sibi umquam fuisset esse acquisitum a Deo de novo in aliquo initio temporis. Quod 
falsum est simpliciter et impossibile, cum contrarium tenet fides, quae ponit quod mundus a Deo aliquando 
novus factus est.”  
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Here Henry points to a distinction between those arguments for the possibility of an 
eternal world that do not exclude the contrary possibility, and those that do.65 For Henry, 
the necessary creation argument belongs to the latter group. If one regards creation as 
necessary (which Henry thinks follows from the eternity of the world), then one excludes 
the possibility that God created the world at some time. However, that the world began as 
something new in time belongs to the teaching of faith. Therefore, it is impossible that 
the world exists from eternity.  
 Auriol’s advocacy of the doctrine of divine freedom (and thus his agreement with 
Henry) also depends on his adherence to principles derived from faith. Recall that, for 
Auriol, the vis productionis causes a being to exist only for the being’s first instant; 
afterwards, a thing continues to exist only if God maintains it. If the vis productionis 
could cause a being to last beyond its first instant, then the being would be necessary for 
that time, and perhaps for all time.66 Regarding this argument, Auriol writes,  
The consequent is contrary to the faith, because according to faith the creature 
needs something conserving it for any time, and thus if it lasts, this is due to 
another maintenance, whereby the thing produced is maintained, or from the 
production itself. Therefore, the production of a creature does not last from itself, 
except for an instant; therefore it is measured by a passing instant that cannot be 
eternal.67  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 As an example of the former, consider an argument Aquinas rehearses: “God does not withhold from any 
creature what is within its capacity in accordance with its nature. But there are some creatures with a nature 
capable of having always existed, as, for example, heaven. Therefore heaven seems to have received the 
gift of eternal existence. And if we grant that heaven existed, we ought also to grant that other creatures 
existed, as the Philosopher shows in Book II of De caelo et mundo” (De potentia Dei, in St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure, On the Eternity of the World, q.3, a.17, 45). The major premise 
of this argument is not true in all cases. God frequently allows creatures to die for lack of nourishment. 
That said, even one who for other reasons denies the possibility of a world from eternity can recognize that 
the argument, though not demonstrative, gives us some ground for regarding an eternal world as possible. 
Thus the argument speaks on behalf of an eternal world without excluding the possibility that the world is 
not eternal.     
66 Petrus Aureolus, Scriptum super II Sent., d.1., q.1, a.2, 15: “Sed creatura vi productionis suae non habet, 
quod duret, nisi per instans, alias per aliquam durationem posset durare sine conservatione, et pari ratione, 
non video, quare non per totum tempus.”  
67 Ibid.: “Consequens et contra fidem, quia pro quocunque tempore creatura indiget conservante secundum 
fidem; et ideo si durat hoc est ex alia manutenetia, qua manutenetur res producta, vel ipsa productio, ergo 
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According to Auriol, if the force of production could conserve a thing past its first 
instant, it would not need God to conserve it; but this is contrary to the faith, which holds 
that things’ continued existence requires there be something conserving them; therefore, a 
being’s production lasts only an instant and cannot be eternal. In sum, then, neither Henry 
nor Auriol rejects the possibility of a world from eternity on the basis of philosophical 
principles alone. On the contrary, their respective affirmations of God’s freedom in 
creating (and, consequently, their rejection of the eternity of the world) flow from 
principles they regard as contained in divine Revelation. For Henry, creation cannot be 
eternal (and thus necessary) since that would contradict the article of faith that holds 
creatures acquired being newly from God. For Auriol, on the other hand, creation is 
necessarily measured by a non-eternal instant, since otherwise it would not need God to 
conserve it, which is likewise contrary to Christian faith.  
 But with Ockham we encounter a very different methodological approach to the 
question of a possible world from eternity. He works in the first place as a philosopher; at 
no point does he invoke the teaching of faith, the Bible, or ecclesiastical authorities as 
sources of his principles.68 Specifically, when he answers Henry’s necessary creation 
argument, he makes no appeal to Biblical Revelation or faith, as do Auriol and Henry. 
Nevertheless, though Ockham reasons as a philosopher about the possibility of a world 
from eternity, he remains a theologian. When he concludes his inquiry, he is mindful of 
the truth of faith that God precedes the world by duration, and not by nature only. He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
productio creaturae de se non habet quod duret nisi pro instanti: ergo mensuratur instanti transeunte, quare 
non potest esse aeterna.”   
68 We already saw an example of Ockham’s distinctive methodology above (p. 22-23) when we noted how 
in response to Henry’s view that a creature’s fieri is different from its factum esse, Ockham argued that the 
necessary distinction between fieri and factum esse in creatures (and the corresponding distinction between 
creatio and conservatio) depends on divine Revelation, and not from principles derived from philosophical 
reason.   
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hesitates to arrive at a philosophical conclusion that would not allow room for faith. As a 
philosopher, he has dealt to his satisfaction with all the important arguments against the 
possibility of a world from eternity. As a philosopher, he agrees with thinkers like 
Avicenna, who hold there is no contradiction in the proposition that God necessarily 
created the world from eternity.69 And yet, his conclusion, i.e. that both the eternity of the 
world and its temporal beginning may be reasonably held, illustrates a point of contact 
between himself and Henry: when philosophizing about matters that touch on what the 
faith holds, one must avoid conclusions that exclude the teaching of faith. Since, for 
Ockham, the eternity of the world would imply that God created the world of necessity 
(which was not the case for Aquinas and members of his school), Ockham the theologian 
hesitates to conclude that the possibility of an eternal world is philosophically more likely 
than its impossibility.    
 So why is Ockham important for understanding Gregory’s intervention in the 
eternity of the world debate? As I’ve attempted to show, Ockham’s deceptively modest 
conclusion masks the strength of his philosophical argumentation for the possibility of an 
eternal creation. Unfortunately for Ockham, his engagement with Henry’s thought, while 
philosophically defensible, calls into question an article of faith, namely God’s freedom 
in creating the universe. To make clear that, qua theologian, he did not endorse all the 
views to which he arrived qua philosopher, Ockham phrased the conclusion of his 
question on eternity somewhat over-modestly. Thus what was needed after Ockham was 
a philosophically rigorous response to Henry’s “necessary creation argument” that gave 
proper respect to the doctrine of divine freedom in creation. The challenge was to defend 
the possibility of an eternal creation, by showing that God could freely cause even an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See n.6 above.   
	   34	  
eternal universe. As I will try to show in chapter three, this is another goal of Gregory of 
Rimini’s discussion of the eternity of the world. I noted above that Ockham agreed with 
Henry that a world from eternity is incompatible with divine freedom partly because he 
believed that Henry was correct that God cannot undo the past.70 In chapter three I will 
argue that Gregory addresses God’s power to undo the past to show how an eternal world 
and God’s freedom in creating the world may be compatible.     
Having treated the arguments of Auriol and Ockham, two of Gregory of Rimini’s 
most significant fourteenth-century predecessors, in chapter two I will turn to Gregory 
himself, in hopes of showing how his account of the continuum as composed of an actual 
infinity of parts equips him to answer the arguments of Peter Auriol.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 91. 
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Chapter Two - Gregory of Rimini on the Composition of Continua and its Relation 
to the Possibility of a World ab aeterno 
 
 
In chapter two, I will attempt to show how Gregory’s account of the composition 
of continua permits him to respond to Auriol’s arguments (and ultimately to Henry’s) 
against the possibility of an eternal creation. At the outset a caveat is necessary, however. 
My exposition and interpretation of Gregory’s views in chapter two, though faithful to his 
thinking, go a bit beyond the obvious sense of the text. Gregory’s thinking about continua 
does indeed inform what he says about a possible eternal creation (esp. in some of his 
replies to objections). Furthermore, his views about continua help him see why Auriol is 
incorrect in his view that creation occurs in a single, durationless instant. Nevertheless, a 
good bit of careful reading is required to see these features of Gregory’s thought. One 
could read Lectura super Secundum, d.1, q.3 and walk away with little sense of how 
Gregory’s views about continua inform his answer to Auriol. For example, when Gregory 
explicitly engages Auriol’s principal argument against the eternity of the world, he does 
not question Auriol’s all-important premise that creation occurs in a durationless instant. 
In other words, Gregory engages Auriol on Auriol’s terms. Study of other portions of 
Lectura super secundum (henceforth, LSS) however, shows that Gregory did not accept 
that premise. When one reads LSS, d.1, q.3 with an awareness of Gregory’s teaching 
regarding the composition of continua, one recognizes that his answer to Auriol is fuller 
than first appears.  
This chapter has two parts. First, I will show how Gregory overtly deals with 
Auriol’s argument that unless God created the world in an instant, God’s freedom is in 
jeopardy. In the second part I aim to show how Gregory’s accounts of the composition of 
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magnitudes and temporal continua permit a fuller refutation of Peter Auriol. I divide part 
two into two sections. First, I will exposit the three theses Gregory proposes at LSS, d.2, 
q.2 concerning the composition of magnitudes. Second, I will show how Gregory applies 
his theory of the composition of magnitudes to the composition of temporal continua. The 
second section of the second part aims to show how, like magnitudes, temporal continua 
contain infinite proportional parts. In the course of section two of part two, I hope it will 
become clear how Gregory’s thinking about the composition of magnitudes gives us good 
reason to deny Auriol’s view that creation occurred in an indivisible, duration-less 
instant.  
 
I. Gregory of Rimini’s Answer to Peter Auriol 
First, then, let’s examine how Gregory handles Auriol’s views on the eternity of 
the world. At LSS d.1, q.3, a.1, Gregory reports Auriol’s argument in precisely the terms 
we’ve rehearsed above: “It is argued thus by others: No production measured by a 
passing instant can be eternal. But every production of a creature, from the force whereby 
it is the production of a creature, is measured by a passing instant. Therefore, etc.”71 He 
notes that, for those advancing this argument, the major is true on account of the 
distinction between a creature’s production and its maintenance. Since the instant of a 
creature’s production is the beginning of its time of maintenance, its production is finite a 
parte ante and thus the world’s production cannot be from eternity.72 Finally, the minor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71Gregorius Ariminensis, OESA, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum: Tomus IV, Super 
Secundum (dist. 1-5), ed. A. Damasus Trapp (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979), d.1, q.3, a.1, 100: “Quinto 
arguitur sic ab aliis: Nulla productio mensurata instanti transeunte potest esse aeterna. Sed omnis productio 
creaturae, ex vi qua est productio creaturae, habet quod mensuretur instanti transeunte. Ergo etc.” 
72 Ibid.: “Tum quia in omni mensurato instanti transeunte prooductio differt a manutenentia, et instans 
productionis fuit initium temporis mensurantis manutenentiam. Igitur tempus manutenentiae est finitum a 
parte ante, et per consequens productio non fuit ab aeterno, igitur nec res producta.” 
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also holds, since if a creature is not produced in a passing instant, it could endure without 
anything conserving it, which is contrary to faith.73   
 In his response to Auriol, Gregory tackles Auriol’s major premise before 
proceeding to oppose the minor. To dispute the major premise, i.e. “no production 
measured by a passing instant can be eternal,” he distinguishes two ways of taking it. 
According to the first, it asserts, “It is impossible that something produced in a passing 
instant is or has been from eternity.”74 Or the phrase may be taken to mean, “It is 
impossible that something from eternity was produced in a passing instant.”75 Although 
both ways of taking the phrase seem eminently reasonable at first glance, Gregory rejects 
both as false. Neither proposition is correct, for “it is possible that something has been 
produced and is also produced in an instant, and yet in no instant was it first produced or 
is it first produced.”76 In other words, it’s not necessary to think of the world as having 
been produced by God in a first instant, and as thereafter conserved by God for as long as 
it exists. On the contrary, God may produce the world continuously in successive instants 
stretching infinitely into the past.77 Accordingly, the phrase “no production measured by 
a passing instant can be eternal” is false in both senses, since God can produce a thing in 
every instant from eternity without any of those instants being itself eternal.78 Gregory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid.: “Alioquin per aliquam durationem posset durare sine conservante, et pari ratione per totum tempus, 
quod est falsum et contra fidem.” Interestingly, in reporting the objection Gregory retains Auriol’s 
comment that to claim a creature can exist past its first instant by the vis productionis involves denying a 
doctrine of faith, i.e. that creatures always depend directly on God for their existence. That Gregory 
combats this objection is evidence that faith and philosophy do not have the same relation for Gregory as 
they do for Auriol. We will discuss this point further in chapter three.    
74 Ibid., 111: “Impossibile est aliquid productum in instanti transeunte esse vel fuisse ab aeterno.” 
75	  Ibid.: “Impossibile est aliquid ab aeterno fuisse productum in instanti transeunte.”	  
76 Ibid.: “Quoniam possibile est aliquid esse productum et produci etiam actu in instanti, et in nullo tamen 
instanti esse primo productum vel primo produci.” 
77 As I indicated above (p.19), Ockham makes a similar argument (Quaestiones Variae, q.3, 85) in the 
course of articulating a non-Christian notion of creation, according to which one does not distinguish 
between creation and conservation.   
78 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum, d.1, q.3, a.1, 111.  
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also criticizes Auriol’s view that production necessarily differs from maintenance. Auriol 
is correct to differentiate production and maintenance relative to beings that begin. A 
being cannot be said to be conserved in its first instant, as it belongs to the meaning of “to 
be conserved” that the thing in question existed immediately prior to being conserved. 
Nevertheless, for the creature that exists from eternity (and Gregory sees no reason why 
one couldn’t), there is no distinction between production and maintenance. 79  For 
Gregory, this point also overcomes Auriol’s view that, if the force of a thing’s production 
lasts past the thing’s initial instant, then the thing would be able to exist without God 
conserving it. On the contrary, if God produces a thing in each instant from eternity, the 
thing never exists independently of God. Finally, Gregory’s argumentation should allay 
Auriol’s greatest fear, namely, that creation from eternity would jeopardize God’s 
freedom in creating. On the contrary, if God produces a being in every instant such that it 
never exists apart from his causal activity, then God remains free to cease producing it at 
any moment. 
 In other portions of Gregory’s question, he explains at greater length why it is 
incorrect to posit a necessary difference between God’s production and maintenance of 
the world. For instance, at LSS, d.1, q.3, a.1, Gregory’s prima conclusio claims, “It is 
possible for something to come to be all at once from God, even though neither it nor any 
part of it begins to be then.”80 Gregory marshals two examples to prove his point, one 
from supernatural revelation, another from nature. First, he reasons that since God the 
Father produces the Son wholly, without the Son or any part of him beginning to be at 
any time, and God is no less able to produce one thing wholly and without beginning than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Ibid. 
80Ibid., 104: “Prima est quod possibile est aliquam rem simul totam fieri a deo, et tamen nec ipsam nec 
aliquid eius tunc incipere esse.”  
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any other thing, God’s omnipotence includes the ability to produce some creature without 
that creature or any part of it ever beginning to be.81 Next, Gregory supports his view 
with observations of how air becomes light. He remarks, “Whenever air becomes lucid, it 
becomes its light.” No part of the air becomes light before the other parts; instead, the 
whole mass of air becomes light at once. Moreover, air changes from darkness to light 
only in the instant when the light first shines upon the air, as when one opens the shutters 
of a dark room. Thereafter, the air continues to become light all at once without any part 
of it becoming light first. Moreover, as at any moment except the first the light converts 
air entirely to light, without the air beginning to be light, so God produces the world now 
without the world beginning to be now. Thus since God’s power is eternal, it is possible 
that God makes the world come to be at every moment without it ever having begun.82 
The upshot of Gregory’s argument here is that since fieri and primo fieri are not 
coextensive, i.e. things often become though they have long existed, it’s not 
philosophically necessary to differentiate production and maintenance. As the Father 
produces the Son without the Son ever beginning to exist, God may analogously produce 
the world at each moment without the world every having begun.     
 Gregory’s secunda conclusio, namely, “It is possible for some thing to come to be 
all at once from God without any sudden or successive change,” likewise forms part of 
his reply to Auriol.83 Gregory reasons to this conclusion on the basis of what he showed 
immediately prior, i.e., that it is possible for something to come to be wholly without it or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81Ibid.: “Primam conclusionem probo sic primo…Antecedens patet de facto, nam nunc filius dei producitur 
a patre…Et constat quod totus simul [producitur], et quod nec ipse nec aliquid eius nunc incipit esse. 
Consequentia probatur, quia non magis est impossibile quod aliquid fiat, et cum fit, non incipiat esse quam 
quod aliquid generetur vel alias vere producatur, et cum producitur, non incipiat esse. Nec deus minus 
potest hoc possibile quam illud.”  
82Ibid.,104-105.  
83 Ibid., 104: “Secunda, quod possibile est aliquam rem totam simul a deo fieri sine aliqua mutatione subita 
vel successive.” 
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any part of it coming to be then. If the prima conclusio holds and there is not a necessary 
difference between production and maintenance in being, then God can bring something 
about without that thing’s becoming constituting a change. On Gregory’s line of thinking, 
God does this every time he preserves a thing that existed in the previous moment. On the 
other hand, when change occurs, whether the change happens in an instant or over a 
stretch of instants, there is a passage from non-being to being. As Gregory writes, “If… 
something comes to be all at once and with change from non-being to being, therefore, 
when it comes to be, it is; and immediately before it was not, and through the consequent 
then it begins to be.”84 This scenario sounds very much like what Auriol proposes in 
arguing against the possibility of a world from eternity. As we’ve seen, for Auriol God’s 
production of the world necessarily occurs in an indivisible instant before which there 
was nothing and after which God conserves the world. Auriol regards creation as a 
sudden change from the world’s non-being to its being. On the contrary, Gregory has 
labored to show that since production and maintenance are not necessarily different, God 
can cause something to exist without God’s act of causing resulting in any sudden 
change. In other words, though by faith Gregory knows that creation did occur suddenly, 
there is no logical contradiction in the idea of a creation not involving a passage from 
non-being to being.   
In each of these arguments, Gregory answers Auriol on the latter’s terms. Recall 
that Auriol premises his position against the possibility of a world from eternity on the 
view that God produced the world in a single, indivisible instant, after which God 
maintains the world. Had the instant of the world’s production had any duration at all, i.e. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Ibid.,105: “Et huiusmodi mutatio non potest esse nisi ex non esse in esse, ut certum est. Si autem aliquid 
fiat totum simul et cum mutatione de non esse ad esse, igitur quando fit, est; et prius immediate non fuit, et 
per consequens tunc incipit esse.” 
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had the vis productionis propelled the world past its initial “now,” then for some stretch 
of time (and conceivably for all time), God would not have been free to destroy the 
world. Therefore, Auriol’s view requires one to accept that the world’s initial “now” was 
duration-less, i.e. indivisible. In the response to Auriol we’ve reported above, Gregory 
argues as if he accepts that view of an instant. In his question on the eternity of the world, 
instead of attacking Auriol’s view of the nature of an instant, he indicates that something 
can be produced in an instant (or better in an infinite succession of instants), without any 
single instant being eternal. Again, when he criticizes the saying “in everything measured 
by a passing instant, production differs from maintenance,” he forgoes questioning 
Auriol’s notion of a “passing instant”, electing instead to challenge the view that 
production and maintenance are necessarily different.  
 But what if Gregory had challenged the notion of an instant implicit in Auriol’s 
argument, and then approached the question of the possibility of a world from eternity 
from his own perspective of the nature of instants and time? In what follows, I will 
discuss how Gregory conceives of “nows” and time, and how those conceptions give him 
significantly more resources to argue on behalf of a possible eternal creation. This portion 
of the chapter will proceed in a few steps: first, we will examine Gregory’s views 
regarding the composition of magnitudes, i.e. a spatial continua, since this will help us 
understand his account of the composition of temporal continua.           
 
II. Gregory, Continua, and the Eternity of the World 
 
A. Gregory on the Composition of Space 
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Gregory of Rimini addresses the composition of spatial continua in the LSS, d.2, 
q.2. In article one, Gregory advances three theses: First, he claims that no magnitude is 
composed of indivisibles; second, that every magnitude is in turn composed of infinite 
magnitudes; finally, that no magnitude contains anything intrinsically indivisible.85 
Gregory supports his denial that magnitudes are composed of indivisibles with several 
arguments, some based on the principles of mathematics, others on the principles of 
physics. Let’s look briefly at one of Gregory’s physical arguments to get a taste of how 
he proves the prima conclusio of article one.  
The argument (which he borrows from VI Physics) is a reductio ad absurdum. 
Gregory posits that two objects, one fast and another slow, travel regularly and 
continuously through space. He asks us to imagine that the space through which the two 
objects move is composed of indivisible points. Although one is fast and the other slow, 
if the two objects begin to move at the same time, both will reach the first point in space 
at the same time. Why? The faster object cannot reach the first point before the slower 
object, since then the slower object would be only part of the way to the first point, and 
that would require the first point to be divisible, which is contrary to the posited 
indivisibility of points. Nor can the slower object reach the first point earlier, for then it 
would be faster and not slower than the faster object. Thus, the faster and slower object 
would reach the first point (and all subsequent points, for that matter) at the same time. In 
effect, if space is composed of indivisibles, then all regularly and continuously moving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85Richard Cross notes that in texts dealing with spatial continua, Gregory uses “magnitudo” and 
“continuum” interchangeably (Richard Cross, “Infinity, Continuity, and Composition: The Contribution of 
Gregory of Rimini”, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 7 [1998]: 91, n.5). A magnitude is nothing other 
than a spatial continuum.      
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objects would move at the same speed, which is obviously absurd. Thus, space is not 
composed of indivisibles.86  
Gregory fields a number of objections to his position that magnitudes are not 
composed of indivisibles. His reply to the fourth objection is especially pertinent to our 
inquiry into the possibility of a world from eternity, since there he introduces the notion 
of proportional parts. The objection claims that in a line A, either there is some mean 
between the first point of A and all other points of the line, or there is not. If there is a 
mean, then there will be some point immediate to the first point. On the other hand, if 
there is no mean between the first point and all other points, then all the other points 
(considered as a whole series) will be immediate to the first point. If this weren’t the case, 
then there would be empty space between the first point and the next point, implying 
there wasn’t a line to begin with. As it turns out, therefore, a line is inevitably composed 
of points immediate to one another. Moreover, if the points are immediate to one another, 
they necessarily lack parts, since if the points were divisible, only parts of the points 
would be immediate to one another, and not the points per se, which is contrary to what 
was posited.87 
As I mentioned, Gregory answers the argument in terms of the proportional parts 
of a magnitude. The notion of proportional parts is simple: to divide a magnitude 
according to proportional parts, one begins at one edge of the magnitude, e.g. the right 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum, d.2, q.2, a.1, 285-286: “Si magnitudo componeretur ex 
indivisibilibus, sequeretur quod aequales magnitudines vel spatia in eadem mensura primo pertransirent 
mobile velox, regulariter et continue motum, et mobile tardum, etiam continue et regulariter motum. 
Consequens hoc et est contra sensum et implicat contradictionem, sicut patet ex definitionibus horum 
nominum ‘velox’ et ‘tardum.’”     
87 Ibid., 290: “Quarto, et fortius. Aut aliquod punctum est medium inter primum punctum huius lineae verbi 
gratia A et omnia alia puncta eiusdem, aut nullum punctum est medium inter punctum primum lineae A et 
omnia alia puncta eiusdem. Hoc patet, quia partes huius disiunctivae contradicunt mutuo: Si aliquod est 
medium, igitur illud est immediatum primo puncto; si nullum est medium, igitur primum punctum et   
omnia alia sunt immediata, et per consequens aliquod aliorum punctorum est primo immediatum.”  
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edge, and proceeding toward the left, divides it by some proportion, e.g. by half. Next, 
continuing toward the left edge of the original magnitude, one divides the left half by 
half. Yet again, one moves further toward the left, dividing the left quarter of the original 
magnitude by half, etc., etc. Gregory observes that since magnitudes are not composed of 
indivisibles, this process can continue indefinitely. Answering the objection reported 
above, he presents a scenario according to which there are two immediate bodies, A and 
B. If B is divided according to proportional parts, such that the first part is the half of B 
immediate to A, the second is the quarter of B immediate to A, and the third is the eighth 
of B immediate to A, then there will never be a single part of B immediate to A, since all 
the proportional parts of B will be immediate to A. Moreover, since even the smallest of 
the proportional parts of B contains infinite parts, each of which themselves include 
infinite proportional parts, etc., there will never be a single proportional part of B 
immediate to A.88 The upshot of Gregory’s reply is that, given the infinite divisibility of 
any segment of a magnitude (including of a point), just as there is not single sliver of B 
immediate to A, so there is no single indivisible point of line immediate to the line’s first 
point.      
The secunda conclusio Gregory proposes at LSS, d.2, q.2, a.1 is that every 
magnitude contains infinite magnitudes. Before showing why this is true, Gregory notes 
one may speak about the infinite in two ways. As we noted in chapter one regarding the 
so-called “infinite souls argument,” Aristotle had distinguished between actual and 
potential infinities. Writing about Gregory of Rimini, Richard Cross notes that fourteenth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Ibid., 292: “Si sint duo corpora A et B, dividendo B in partes proportionales sic quod prima pars sit eius 
medietas remotior ab A, et secunda sit medietas alterius medietatis, immediata priori medietati totius, et 
tertia sit medietas residui, et sic semper procedendo versus A, tunc haec est vera ‘A et omnes partes 
proportionales B sunt immediata’, et tamen haec est falsa ‘aliqua pars proportionalis B est immediata ipsi 
A’, cum talium nulla sit ultima versus A.” 
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century thinkers often replaced Aristotle’s distinction with one that was similar, yet more 
rigorous, namely that between syncategorematic and categorematic infinities. 89  For 
Gregory, continua and discrete things may be infinite syncategorematically. A continuum 
is infinite syncategorematically if it can be greater than anything finite (quantocumque 
finito maius). For example, some cosmologists speak of the universe as infinite inasmuch 
as it is continually expanding: there is no end to the universe, but it’s not so great that it 
cannot become greater. On the other hand, discrete things are infinite 
syncategorematically if, given any finite number of things, there can always be more of 
them  (quotcumque finitis plura).90 For example, the number of future days is potentially 
unlimited. In contrast, a continuum is infinite categorematically if its extension is greater 
than all finite space (maius quantocumque finito), and discrete things are infinite 
categorematically if they are so numerous as to exceed all finite numbers (plura 
quotcumque finitis).91 In article one of LSS, d.2, q.2, Gregory argues that any magnitude 
contains infinite magnitudes, both syncategorematically and categorematically 
speaking.92   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Cross, “Infinity, Continuity, and Composition”, 98. 	  
90 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum, d.2, q.2, a.1, 294. 
91 Ibid. It’s significant that in this passage Gregory gives two sets of definitions of syncategorematic and 
categorematic infinities, respectively. First, he says that a syncategorematically infinite continuum is non 
tantum quin maius, and syncategorematically infinite discrete things are non tot quin plura. On the other 
hand, a categorematically infinite contiuuum is tantum quod non maius, and categorematically infinite 
discrete things are tot quod non plura. However, he then proceeds to give the four definitions we mentioned 
above, which he says he are more proper. Maier gives a fine explanation of why Gregory prefers the second 
set of definitions: if one conceives of categorematically infinite discrete things as tot quod non plura, one 
risks confusing a categorematic infinity for a “maximum number” of things. Gregory, on the contrary, 
thinks of a categorematic infinity as “transfinite”, i.e. “greater than any imaginable finite size or number.” 
Each of Gregory’s prefered appellations emphasizes that both actual infinities, syncategorematic and 
categorematic, are not to be conceived as maximums. Moreover, in distinguishing syncategorematic and 
categorematic infinities, the word-order Gregory uses is decisive. For example, when he says a 
syncategorematically infinite continuum is quantocumque finito maius, the sense is that it is greater than 
any [beliebige] finite size, but when he says a contiuum is maius quantocumque finito, the sense is 
categorematic, signifying that it is greater than all finite sizes (Anneliese Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis, 
214-215; 215, n. 124).      
92 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum, d.2, q.2, a.1, 295.  
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Naturally, this claim requires ample explanation. Gregory argues for the claim in 
three steps. His first step is to show that every magnitude has parts. Of course, he had 
already done this work when he proved that magnitudes are not composed of indivisibles. 
If a magnitude did not include parts, then it would be indivisible, which we already know 
is not the case. Yet, in this step of the argument Gregory makes two additional 
observations: 1) some parts of a magnitude are distant from other parts, e.g. an extreme 
half of one part is distant from an adjoining part, and 2) of any magnitude, some parts are 
greater than others, e.g. a quarter is less than a half. Both of these sub-points are 
important for Gregory’s attempt to show how magnitudes have infinite parts. Secondly, 
Gregory shows that every magnitude contains syncategorematically infinite parts. Again, 
this follows from his proof that magnitudes are not composed of indivisibles. If a part can 
be divided further without ever arriving at a basic unit, then there is no numerical limit to 
the parts of a magnitude. A magnitude thus includes syncategorematically infinite parts.93    
Next, Gregory attempts to ground the much bolder claim that a magnitude 
contains categorematically infinite parts. Yet again, he relies heavily on something he has 
already shown, namely that magnitudes are not composed of indivisibles. Keeping this in 
mind, let’s imagine that we were able to see the complete division of a magnitude.94 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Ibid., 295-296. 
94 One may ask how a magnitude can be completely divided if it is not composed of indivisibles. Since no 
part is indivisible, couldn’t one continue to divide parts into smaller parts, e.g. into halves, ad infinitum? In 
fact, this objection confuses syncategorematic and categorematic infinities. If the division is an infinite 
process, such that however many divisions we’ve made of a line, we can always make more, the parts are 
syncategorematically infinite. In contrast, a categorematic infinite cannot be exceeded. Categorematically 
infinite parts are not the result of a temporally extended process of division. Rather, God’s mind (and only 
God’s mind) beholds a continuum’s categorematic infinity of parts all at once. As Gregory writes, “Since 
God immediately and all by himself can conserve any entity whatever in being without anything else that 
does not belong to it essentially, he could actually divide each and every proportional part existing in a 
continuum from each and every other proportional [part] that is not part [of the first one], and conserve in 
existence all such parts. With that done, there will be an actual infinite multitude of discrete things…” 
(LSP, d. 42-44, q.4, a.1, 442; thanks to Russell Friedman for access to his translation of this passage). Or 
again, “In God’s conception the continuum is totally actually divided into parts, of which each is also 
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Clearly, the number of divisions of a completely divided magnitude cannot be finite, e.g. 
4 or 100, since if one were left with a finite number of parts, one could continue dividing 
them, since the original magnitude was not composed of indivisibles. Thus if one takes 
collectively all the parts of the whole magnitude, then the parts must be more than any 
determinate number, which is the very definition of a categorematic infinite.95 Gregory 
also argues that, if the parts of a magnitude are syncategorematically infinite, it follows 
that they are categorematically infinite, too. This must be the case, for if a magnitude 
included a determinate number of parts, its parts wouldn’t be syncategorematically 
infinite, since the magnitude’s parts are finite only if no further division is possible. For 
Gregory, syncategorematic infinity implies categorematic infinity and vice-versa.96 Thus 
one may summarize the distinction between a syncategorematic and categorematic 
infinite as it relates to the parts of a spatial continuum: on the one hand, a magnitude 
includes a syncategorematic infinity of parts, for no matter how many parts one has made 
through dividing, one can always continue to divide and so have more parts; on the other 
hand, a magnitude includes categorematically infinite parts, since if all possible divisions 
could be made (and they are all made in God’s mind), the parts would exceed any finite 
number.97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
totally divided, and includes infinitely many actually divided [parts]” (LSP., d.35-36, q.1, 224; cited in 
Cross, “Infinity, Continuity, and Composition,” 102).  
95 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum, d.2, q.2, a.1, 296: “Quaelibet pars partis est pars totius 
illius partis. Igitur, omnes partes totius collective sumendo et ad bonum intellectum, sunt plures quam 4 et 
quam 100, et sic quotcumque determinati numeri. Alias esset dare maximum numerum earum et tunc nulla 
illarum haberet partem et partem, quod repugnat antecedenti [i.e. cuiuslibet magnitudinis quaelibet pars 
habet partem].”  
96 Ibid., 297: “Generaliter de quibuscumque de inesse et praesenti vere dicitur quod sunt infinita 
syncategorematice, vere etiam dicitur quod sunt infinita categorematice, et econverso.”        
97 Anneliese Maier notes that medieval thinkers had numerous ways of speaking about the same distinction. 
For example, a categorematic infinite is infinite in the sense of “transfinite”, while a syncategorematic 
infinite is infinite in the sense of “indefinite.” The universe expands infinitely, i.e. indefinitely, but at no 
moment does the universe contain transfinite space. Alternatively, some medievals spoke of an infinitum in 
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Before proceeding to Gregory’s third thesis about the composition of magnitudes,  
let’s note that what we already know about Gregory’s notion of proportional parts and his 
distinction between syncategorematic and categorematic infinities positions us to see why 
he isn’t bothered by two of Peter Auriol’s arguments against the eternity of the world 
reported toward the end of part one of chapter one. Recall that for Auriol, a world from 
eternity would present at least two inconvenientia: first, it would mean that a part would 
be equal to the whole, e.g. the moon’s revolutions, though covering only a part of the 
distance of the sun’s revolutions, would equal them, since one infinite cannot be greater 
than another. Second, if the world has been from eternity, then infinite days have passed. 
However, this implies the traversal of an actual infinite, which is impossible. Regarding 
the first purported inconveniens, Gregory’s appeal to a magnitude’s proportional parts 
reveals that not all infinities are created equal, or at least not in every respect. Obviously, 
the distance the sun covers in infinite revolutions is greater than that covered by the 
moon. Nevertheless, either distance, if completely divided into proportional parts by the 
same proportion, e.g. ¼, includes categorematically infinite parts (plura quotcumque 
finitis). Thus, while one distance is greater than the other simpliciter, considered as 
completely divided into proportional parts, the distances are equal. Moreover, to the 
allegation that an eternal creation implies the traversal of an actual infinite, Gregory 
could answer Auriol that the total revolutions of the sun and the moon over infinite days 
represent syncategorematic infinities, i.e. actual infinities that are potentially greater. The 
process of the sun and moon revolving around the earth may continue ad infinitum, as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fieri, i.e. syncategorematic infinite, and of an infinitum in facto esse, i.e. categorematic infinite (Maier, Die 
Vorläufer Galileis, 156-157).  
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process whereby a created agent divides a magnitude into proportional parts can likewise 
be never-ending. 
 Lastly, we arrive at the third conclusion Gregory advances in article one, namely 
that a magnitude includes nothing intrinsically indivisible. He proves the conclusion thus: 
if there is a point in a magnitude A, either there is precisely one, or many. But the first 
alternative is impossible, since if there were a magnitude A with only one point, there 
would be a part of A without any points, and this part would itself be a magnitude. 
Moreover, if one magnitude lacks points, then no magnitude includes points, since the 
same judgment is true of all magnitudes.98  Neither can a magnitude include many points, 
however. If this were so, then besides all the points taken singly or altogether, either there 
would be some residual entity, or not. If not, then it is established that the whole 
magnitude is composed of indivisibles, which Gregory showed to be impossible when he 
proved the first conclusion. If there is an entity besides the points, it is infinitely divisible 
magnitude, since it does not include any indivisible points. However, as we just saw, if 
there is a magnitude bereft of points, then no magnitude includes indivisible points, 
which was the very thing Gregory was trying to show.99  Effectively, Gregory’s tertia 
conclusio denies the existence of indivisible points. If points existed, they would exist in 
space;  but what exists in space is a magnitude; however, every magnitude is divided into 
infinite proportional parts, and thus necessarily lacks points, which are per definitionem 
indivisible.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 What Gregory means here is a bit obscure. It seems fallacious to argue that since one magnitude hasn’t 
points, no magnitude has them. Presumably, Gregory means that if one magnitude lacks points, then it 
doesn’t belong to the nature of magnitudes to have points. Thus, if another magnitude includes points, its 
including them is only coincidental to its being a magnitude.      
99 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum, d.2, q.2, a.1, 313.   
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B. Gregory on the Composition of Time 
Why have we devoted so much space of this chapter to Gregory’s account of the 
composition of magnitudes? The answer is simple: As we’ll see, Gregory’s views about 
the possibility of a world from eternity make sense once one understands how he 
conceives of the composition of both magnitudes and temporal continua; moreover, 
Gregory’s account of the composition of time derives largely from his views about 
magnitudes.  
To see how this is so, let’s look at a passage from article two of Gregory’s 
question on the eternity of the world. Similarly to the corresponding article of Auriol’s 
question, there Gregory asks, “Whether it was possible that the whole world has been 
from eternity according the mode whereby it now is and has been since it began.”100 
Gregory gives the following objection: If the world has been from eternity as it now is, 
then there has been an infinite succession of horses. Further, the world and the infinite 
horses were still caused by God, for otherwise they would not be. Yet, God does not 
create universals, e.g. a universal horse. Instead, God’s creative acts terminate in 
particular beings, e.g. this or that specific horse. Therefore, if the world is from eternity, 
God must have created an eternal horse, to which one can trace the successive 
generations of horses, beginning with the horses that exist now. In other words, there 
must have been a horse created immediately by God before which there weren’t horses. 
But between a first horse and the last horse, i.e. a horse that is now, there can be only a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  Ibid., 98: “Secundo, utrum fuerit possibile, ab aeterno fuisse totum mundum secundum modum quo 
nunc est, et fuit ex quo incepit.” Gregory’s manner of phrasing this question reminds us that he, like all 
medieval thinkers who weighed in on this debate, believed that the world began. The issue here is whether 
the world, which Gregory thinks has included the same species and parts since it began, could have existed 
as it does without a temporal start.     
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finite number of horses. Therefore, the world cannot have been from eternity as it now 
is.101  
 Gregory’s answer illustrates how he applies his account of magnitudes to 
temporal continua. First, he concedes that if the world has been from eternity as it is now, 
there would have been infinite horses. But like Aristotle, he denies it follows from this 
that there was some horse ante quem nullus.102 To clarify this, Gregory explains what it 
would mean for horses to exist from eternity. He agrees with the objector that God does 
not create universals, but only this or that particular horse. Thus if the world were eternal, 
“[God] made only singular horses…and from eternity he made some singular horse 
[aliquem equum singularem], with another already generated horse mediating or 
concurring toward its generation.”103 In other words, given a world from eternity, there 
would have been an endless chain of horses, all created by God through secondary 
causes. To maintain that horses as a species are eternal does not imply there was some 
single horse generated by another horse from eternity. For Gregory, if the world has 
always been, there would have always been horses around the place, though none of them 
would be first.104  
To convince the objector that a world from eternity does not imply an eternal 
horse, Gregory compares creation to the continuous intension of a form [intensio 
continua formae]. The comparison connects to a debate among medieval theologians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid., 119-120.  
102 This fallacy, a good example of a quantifier-shift, seems common among those who opposed the 
possibility of a world from eternity, at least judging from objections rehearsed by those who favor the 
possibility. For example, the Dominican James of Metz, who ca.1300 authored a question on the eternity of 
the world, lists a similar argument among the rationes ex parte creaturarum successivarum (see Peck, SJ 
and Schabel, “James of Metz,” Appendix I).    
103 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum, d.1, q.3, a.2, 121. 
104 Ibid. 
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concerning certain kinds of accidental change.105 How does one correctly analyze the 
change occurring when an accidental form is intended (e.g. when coffee in a cup is 
heated from 100 degrees to 120 degrees) or remitted (e.g. when the same coffee is cooled 
from 120 degrees to 100 degrees)? Gregory considers a form   
Which is intended through the addition of a degree. For infinite parts of a form are 
generated and the one generating does not generate some universal form, but only 
a singular. And still he generates no part first, nor among them was there any first 
[part], since before any part was generated, its half was generated.106  
 
In this text, Gregory asks us to imagine any accidental form inhering in an object. 
Sticking with the example offered above, we can consider what occurs when one heats 
coffee. As it turns out, Gregory thinks that like a magnitude, an accidental form, e.g. the 
heat of coffee, has infinite proportional parts.107 Thus intending a form generates infinite 
parts for the accidental form that is intended. Interestingly, however (and this is 
Gregory’s point for the example), even if one intends a form for an instant, the form’s 
increased intensity has no first part. On the contrary, even the smallest part of the form’s 
newly generated intension is divided into infinite proportional parts. Any putative “first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 When Gregory and his medieval colleagues speak of the intension and remission of forms, they are 
concerned with qualitative changes in a substance. Unlike substantial forms like “rationality,” qualities like 
“whiteness”, “heat”, and “grace,” etc., admit of more or less. For a treatment of the development of the 
medieval debate on the intension and remission of forms, see Jung, Elzbieta, “Intension and Remission of 
Forms,” in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500, ed. Erik Lagerlund 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2011): 551-555.         
106 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum, d.1, q.3, a.2, 121: “Et huic simile apparet in intensione 
continua formae, quae intenditur per additionem novi gradus. Infinitae enim partes formae generantur et 
generans non generat formam aliquam universalem sed singularem tantum. Et tamen nullam partem primo 
generat nec inter illas aliqua fuit prima, quoniam cuiuslibet medietas prius genita fuit quam ipsa.” 
107 In his Lectura super primum Sententiarum, d. 44, q.4, a.1 Gregory had already argued for the possibility 
that God can create some intensible or remissible form, e.g. caritas, infinite intensively in its species. One 
of the objections raised against this thesis is the supposed impossibility for something to have infinite parts 
at once. Answering this objection, Gregory concludes the infinite parts of an intensible form from the 
infinite parts of a continuum. He writes, “Nor [is the conclusion impossible on account of] the third 
[possibility], because it is not impossible [for there to be infinite parts of the same thing at once]: just 
consider the parts of the continuum.” (Thanks are due to Russell Friedman for access to his translation of 
d.44, q.4 of LSP.) Since up to that point in d.44, q.4, Gregory has spoken only of spatial continua, i.e. 
magnitudes, it’s clear that in this passage he infers the infinite parts of an intensible form from the infinite 
parts of a magnitude.       
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part” of the coffee’s increased heat to which Gregory’s opponent could point is already 
divided into infinite parts, with the result that there cannot be a first. 
 Gregory’s analysis of continuous intension of an accidental form alerts us to an 
interesting feature of time, namely it is divided into infinite proportional parts the same 
way magnitudes are. We just noted how, for Gregory, intending an accidental form 
generates infinite proportional parts, even if one intends it for an “instant.” What is the 
nature of this instant? Does it have duration? Simply put, the instant in which the coffee 
is heated is not a duration-less, indivisible unit; rather, it necessarily has duration 
corresponding to the coffee’s increased heat. This is evident from the following 
reasoning: The coffee’s increased heat includes infinite proportional parts, each of which 
was generated in an instant; moreover, since the parts were not added simultaneously, 
each of them must have been added at some distinct part of the instant; finally, since the 
parts are proportional parts, the instant in which the parts were generated must likewise 
be divided into proportional parts. In sum, then, in the course of showing why an eternal 
creation does not require that specific creatures are eternal, Gregory has subtly introduced 
the notion of an infinitely divided temporal continuum.108      
  Another argument against the possibility of an eternal creation, along with 
Gregory’s response thereto, helps show how he connects the composition of magnitudes 
to that of time. The objector posits that God makes a triangle, and then each day 
augments its three sides by some determinate quantity. If infinite days have passed since 
God made the shape, there would be an infinite triangle, having sides of infinite length. 
But the lengths of a triangles’ sides are necessarily finite, since otherwise the sides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Since Gregory deduces the infinite parts of an intensible form from the composition of a magnitudes 
(see n. 108), his derivation of the proportional parts of an instant is ultimately related to his theory of the 
composition of magnitudes.    
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wouldn’t meet to form angles. Thus the sides of the infinite triangle would be both 
infinite and finite, which involves a contradiction. It follows that the world cannot be 
from eternity.109  
Gregory’s answer is simply to deny the consequence, namely, that there would be 
a triangle whose sides would be both finite and infinite. As a matter of fact, Gregory 
argues, if God were to augment the sides of a triangle each day the way the argument 
posits, “on no day would there be a triangle, but a certain magnitude having only one 
angle, whose sides would be infinite in other directions.” 110  Then Gregory does 
something interesting, i.e. he makes himself even more clearly the target of the objection. 
He writes  
Notice that the aforesaid difficulties can be thrown at anyone positing that a 
continuum is not composed of indivisibles. Since when this is posited, in any hour 
there are infinite proportional parts of the same proportion. Therefore, let there 
now be posited some triangle or circle. Then I argue that in whatever proportional 
part of the one hour following, God could make a triangle or circle larger 
according to a certain determinate excess, or that he could augment the given one 
in that way… And it is established that God can do whatever he wills no less in a 
part of time however small, than in one day or in one year. But when this is 
posited, it is clear that it follows that at the end of an hour, indeed, certainly and in 
whatever part of its aforesaid proportion there will be an infinite circle and an 
infinite triangle.111 
 
Gregory’s point is that, in a certain sense, the objection may seem even more effective 
against one who, like himself, believes that a continuum is not composed of indivisibles, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid., 120. 
110 Ibid., 122: “Quinimmo supposito tali augmento nulla die fuisset triangulus, sed magnitudo quaedam 
unum tantummodo habens angulum, cuius latera in aliam partem essent infinita.”  
111 Ibid., 122-123: “Et adverte quod cuilibet possunt ingeri similiter difficultates praedictae, ponenti 
continuum non componi ex indivisibilibus. Quoniam hoc posito in qualibet hora sunt infinitae partes 
proportionales eiusdem proportionis. Ponatur ergo nunc aliquis triangulus vel circulus. Tunc arguam quod 
poterit deus in qualibet parte proportionali unius horae sequentis maiorem triangulum vel circulum 
secundum determinatum excessum facere, vel datum modo illo augmentare…Et constat quod non minus in 
quantumcumque parva parte temporis potest deus agere quidquid vult quam in una die vel in uno anno. Hoc 
autem posito, patet quod sequitur quod in fine horae, immo certe et in qualibet parte eius proportionis 
preaedictae erit circulus infinitus et triangulus infinitus.”  
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or better said, who thinks a continuum is composed of infinite proportional parts. For if 
that is the case, since posita hypotesi an hour has infinite parts, then if God augments the 
sides of a triangle by some quantity at every part of an hour, even at the end of an hour 
there will be an impossible figure, i.e. and infinite triangle. Moreover, since God can 
accomplish as much in any part of an hour as he can in the whole, then even at the end of 
an infinitesimally short period there can be an infinite triangle. Apparently, then, Gregory 
is more vulnerable to the objection than his opponent anticipated: while the opponent 
thought that a contradiction, i.e. an infinite triange, would arise after infinite time, 
Gregory shows that for him the contradiction would arise much sooner. 
 What answer does Gregory make? Only that, “All should answer [the argument] 
generally in the aforesaid way.”112 In other words, what Gregory said initially in reply to 
the objection is still valid, namely, supposing God augments the sides of a triangle in the 
way posited, at no time would there be a triangle, but only a single angle with two infinite 
sides. This reply is significant, since it provides further evidence of the correlation 
between the infinite parts of a magnitude and the infinite parts of any stretch of time. 
Consider, for example, Gregory’s claim that at the end of an hour there would be an 
infinite triangle. Gregory is certain of this only because of the infinite proportional parts 
of a hour, however. Since there are infinite parts to an hour, no matter by how much the 
triangles’ sides are augmented in each part of an hour, the result will be an infinite 
magnitude. Further, Gregory’s own example, e.g. “in whatever proportional part of the 
one hour following, God could make a triangle or circle larger according to a certain 
determinate excess, or that he could augment the given one in that way”, evinces the 1:1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Ibid., 123: “Respondendum est ergo ab omnibus communiter modo praedicto.” 
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correspondence between the parts of the temporal continuum and the parts of magnitude 
God generates.      
 Other passages of LSS help us understand why Gregory thinks that temporal 
continua, like magnitudes, are composed of infinite proportional parts. At d.2, q.1, a.1, 
Gregory explains that “time” has two meanings. First, “time” may be taken as the 
duration “of motion, rest, and permanence of a mutable and not-necessarily-existing 
thing.” According to this sense, time “is nothing other than a thing itself continuously 
moved, resting, or enduring.”113 In a second sense, “Time is taken as some measure or as 
something whereby the duration of motion or rest can itself be properly measured.”114 For 
Gregory, “time” refers either to the duration of things’ motion, rest, or permanence, or to 
the measure of things’ motion. In what follows, we’ll concern ourselves exclusively with 
the first (objective) meaning of “time.”  
If Gregory conceives of time as the duration of things’ motion, rest, and 
permanence, one naturally asks what he means by “duration.” In the same passage of d.2, 
q.1, a.1, he explains that the duration of motion is “the thing itself continuously moved or 
which is continuously moved, about which namely it is true to say it was immediately 
moved, is actually moved, and also will be moved immediately.” He says the same, 
mutatis mutandis, about the duration of rest and existence.115 A thing’s duration is the 
thing itself as moved, moving, and about to be moved. Further, “If concerning some thing 
it is true to say ‘this is and immediately will be’, but it is not truly said ‘this immediately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Ibid., d.2, q.1 (add.), a.1, 229: “loquendo de tempore primo modo accepto scilicet pro mora vel 
duratione motus et quietis ac permanentiae rei mutabilis et non necessario existentis, ipsum nihil aliud est 
quam ipsamet res continue mota vel quiescens aut durans.”   
114 Ibid., 219-220: “Alio modo potest accepi tempus pro aliqua mensura seu pro aliquo quo potest proprie 
mensurari ipsa mora motus et quietis, id est per quod possumus certificari et cognoscere quamdiu aliquid 
movebatur vel quievit aut duravit.”   
115 Ibid., 229: “Unde duratio motus est ipsamet res continue mota sive quae continue movetur, de qua 
scilicet est verum dicere quod immediate movebatur, actu movetur, et immediate etiam movebitur.”    
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was’, the thing certainly is not enduring, though it may begin to endure by setting out by 
the negation of the present.”116 In other words, motion, rest, or permanence in two 
consecutive moments is not sufficient to have duration; something must have been 
moving, be moving now, and be about to move in order to be temporal, according to 
Gregory’s first sense of time.   
 In accord with this sense of time, it’s easy to see why Gregory regards it as 
divided into infinite proportional parts the same way magnitudes are divided. When a 
thing moves continuously through space, the space through which it moves is itself a 
magnitude divided into infinite proportional parts. If time is the duration of a thing’s 
motion, and the space through which an object moves is divided into proportional parts, 
then the object’s enduring motion is also necessarily divided into infinite proportional 
parts. Further, even if an object is at rest relative to earth, it is still in motion relative to 
objects around it that are in motion relative to earth.  Thus even when an object is at rest 
relative to earth, its duration is still divided into proportional parts, just like the 
magnitude it traverses.   
 That Gregory’s account of time as composed of infinite parts derives from his 
theory of the infinite division of magnitudes becomes yet clearer if we consider what he 
says about the nature of an instant. Recall that earlier we showed how, according to 
Gregory’s first meaning of “time”, time is the mobile thing itself as moved. A little later 
at LSS, d.2, q.1, Gregory again mentions that meaning of “time.” He writes 
Time signifies the mobile thing by connoting that it was in the place where it is 
not, it is in the place where it immediately wasn’t nor immediately will be, and 
immediately will be in the place were it is not. Thus nothing is called “time” 
unless these three things are true concerning it. But an instant signifies the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Ibid.: “Unde si de aliqua re sit verum dicere ‘hoc est et immediate erit’, non vere autem dicatur ‘hoc 
immediate fuit’, ipsa utique non durat, quamvis incipiat durare exponendo per negationem praesentis.”  
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selfsame mobile thing by connoting the place where it is, and additionally by 
connoting that immediately it wasn’t in that place and immediately won’t be in 
it.117  
 
This passage is interesting since it shows that Gregory’s notion of an instant is analogous 
to his notion of time. As time signifies a thing as it is continuously moved through space, 
i.e. as it was immediately moved, is moving, and will immediately be moved, an instant 
signifies a moving object by referring to the place where is now, as distinct from where it 
immediately was and immediately will be. In other words, an instant is a sliver of a 
moving thing’s duration. However, if an instant connotes a place, and place is divided 
into infinite proportional parts, then an instant must also be divided into infinite 
proportional parts. One may now apply to time the three conclusions Gregory reached at 
LSS, d.2, q.2, a.1 apropos of space: a temporal continuum is not composed of indivisibles; 
every temporal continuum is composed of infinite times; and, finally, there is no such 
thing as an indivisible instant. The argument of this section of chapter two has yielded an 
important result for our study of Gregory’s discussion of a world from  eternity: even an 
infinitesimally brief instant includes infinite parts, which themselves each include infinite 
parts. Durationless instants do not exist. Gregory first showed us this when he compared 
creation to the intension of an accidental form and showed why the increased intensity 
lacked any first part. Further, we have just seen that since an instant connotes space, it 
must be composed on infinite proportional parts. In sum, from the infinite divisibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ibid., d.2, q.1, a.1, p.2, 258: “Tempus significat mobile connotando ipsum fuisse in loco in quo non est, 
et esse in loco in quo immediate non fuit nec immediate erit, et immediate fore in loco in quo non est. Ita 
quod de nullo vere dicitur quod est tempus, nisi haec sint vera de ipso. Instans vero significat ipsum idem 
mobile, connotando locum in quo est, et cum hoc etiam connotando quod immediate in illo loco non fuit et 
immediate in eo non erit.”  
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magnitudes, Gregory has deduced the infinite divisibility of even small stretches of 
time.118    
But what does the infinite divisibility of time and instants have to do the with the 
possibility of an eternal creation? After all, a magnitude infinite with respect to its 
proportional parts is still finite with respect to its extension. Similarly, how does knowing 
time is infinite with respect to its parts help us conclude it’s possible for the world to 
have infinite duration a parte ante?  
To grasp the importance of Gregory’s arguments about the composition of 
continua for the eternity of the world, one only need recall the three main features of 
Auriol’s position against a possible eternal creation: 1) the production of creatures 
necessarily occurs in an indivisible, durationless instant; 2) all infinities are equal; and 3) 
it is impossible to traverse an actual infinity. But Gregory’s arguments for the infinite 
divisibility (and the actual division, in God’s mind) of continua have disarmed all three of 
Auriol’s theses. For one, instants are not indivisible and durationless; on the contrary, 
they include infinite parts. Since the “now” during which God created the world had 
duration and infinite parts, and since God was producing the world at each of the 
categorematically infinite parts of the that “now,” there is no contradiction in affirming 
that God could produce the world during an infinite succession of days. Why not? Since 
an infinitesimally small part of an instant and a whole day are only quantitively, and not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 As Maier notes, Gregory of Rimini is not the only medieval thinker to conclude the infinite divisibility 
of time from the indivisibility of space. Among fourteenth century theologians, she writes, “Es geht ja 
immer um das Eine…die Widerspruchslosigkeit des Unendlichkeitsbegriffs als solchen aufzuzeigen, und 
wenn das in einem Fall gelungen ist, so ist damit der Nachweis eigentlich auch für alle andern Fälle geführt 
– genau so wie die Entscheidung über die Struktur des Kontinuums, wenn sie einmal getroffen ist, in 
gleicher Weise für räumliche, zeitliche, and intensive Kontinuen Gültigkeit hat. Ueberdies, und das ist von 
den scholastischen Autoren nur zu oft mit aller Ausführlichkeit dargelegt worden: aus der Möglichkeit der 
infinitas in actu für eine Grössenart folgt, direkt oder indirekt, dieselbe Möglichkeit für alle andern” (Maier, 
Die Vorläufer Galileis, 204).  
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qualitatively different. Gregory has shown that a day, a week, or a year are macro-
versions of what an instant is in microcosm. Both an instant and a day include infinite 
proportional parts, the only difference being that each proportional part of a day is longer 
than the corresponding proprtional part of an instant. But if a part of an instant and a day 
are only quantitatively different, and God creates instants to have infinite parts, there is 
no reason to think God cannot create an infinite succession of days. This is doubly 
apparent if one considers that an infinite succession of days is only a syncategorematic 
infinite (quotcumque finitis plura, i.e. infinitum in fieri), while an instant contains a 
categorematic infinity (plura quotcumque finitis, i.e. infinitum in facto esse). If God can 
make the latter, a fortiori he can certainly bring about the former.    
Secondly, Gregory’s treatment of the infinite divisibility of magnitudes and time 
has established that although infinities are unequal with regard to their extension, they are 
equal with regard to being composed of syncategorematically and categorematically 
infinite parts. Thus, contrary to Auriol’s view, no inconveniens arises if the distance the 
sun has travelled revolving around the earth is somehow “more infinite” than the distance 
covered by the moon in the same time. With respect to their proportional parts, both 
infinite distances are equal: it’s only that each proportional part of the space traversed by 
the sun is larger than the corresponding part of the space traversed by the moon. 
Thirdly, the argument of chapter two has shown that, for Gregory, actual infinities 
do exist. This is especially true from God’s perspective, since God sees the complete 
division of every continuum into categorematically infinite proportional parts. Now, since 
God sees the complete division of a continuum into infinite parts, and God’s “seeing” is 
what produces a continuum’s parts, then God is sufficiently powerful to create an actual 
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infinity of beings. Similarly to the way we argued above, we can now say that since, 
when God produces the infinite parts of a continuum, he produces a categorematic 
infinity, then a fortiori it is possible for God to produce a syncategorematic infinity, i.e. 
an infinite succession of days.  
Having shown how Gregory’s account of the composition of continua permits 
him to diffuse Auriol’s arguments against the possibility of a world from eternity, we 
next proceed in chapter three to discuss how Gregory goes about showing the 
compatibility of a world from eternity and God’s freedom in creating.    
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Chapter Three – The Relevance of God’s Power to Undo the Past for Gregory’s 
Contribution to the Eternity of the World Debate 
 
  
In chapter three, we pick up a question that arose toward the conclusion of chapter 
one, namely whether one may reasonably accept the possibility of a world from eternity 
while also maintaining that God is always free to create or not create the world. This 
question first presented itself to us through our study of William of Ockham’s question 
Utrum mundus potuit fuisse ab aeterno per potentiam divinam. A few things struck us 
about Ockham’s question that it would be good to recall at the outset of this chapter: first, 
unlike Henry and Auriol, Ockham approaches the question of a possible world from 
eternity as a philosopher – he does not take his starting points from Scripture or Christian 
doctrine. Second, Ockham accepts Henry’s view that, if the world has existed from 
eternity, it exists necessarily. The consequent is radically contrary to any Christian 
account of creation. Therefore, despite the autonomy Ockham accords to purely 
philosophical reasoning, because he knows that theologians cannot accept without 
qualification philosophical conclusions inimical to faith, he concludes only that one can 
neither demonstrate nor disprove the possibility of a world from eternity on philosophical 
grounds. Ockham cannot espouse the view that an eternal world is possible, since for him 
this position (though philosophically defensible) is of a piece with a denial of God’s 
freedom in creating.  
In this chapter, I hope to show that Gregory of Rimini’s contribution to the 
eternity of world debate fills a gap left by Ockham. Like Ockham, Gregory sees no 
purely philosophical reason to exclude a world from eternity. Yet, unlike Ockham, 
Gregory thinks one can adopt this view without jeopardizing God’s freedom in creating. 
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How does Gregory argue for the compatibility of an eternal creation and God’s freedom 
in creating? Simply put, Gregory preserves God’s freedom in the event of an eternal 
creation by arguing that God’s absolute power extends so far as to be able to undo the 
past. Thus, this chapter includes three steps: first, I will show that, if God can make past 
events no longer be past, Henry’s “necessary creation argument” is effectively disarmed. 
Next, I will try to show that Gregory in fact holds that view. Thirdly, I will highlight 
several passages in Gregory’s question on the eternity of the world in which his position 
regarding God’s absolute power to undo the past assists him in arguing for the possibility 
of a world from eternity.  
 First, let’s briefly show why the fourteenth century debate over God’s power to 
undo the past is relevant to the eternity of the world debate. Recall that, according to 
Henry, in order for God freely to create or not create the world, there must have been 
some moment preceding creation in which God could have impeded the world’s 
existence. For three reasons Henry argues that, if the world has always been, there could 
have been no such moment. First, posita hypothesi, there was no moment before eternity 
when God could have impeded the world, since there is no “before” eternity. Second, 
since even God is subject to the principle of non-contradiction, God cannot make the 
world not exist while it exists. Finally, after the world has been, and for as long as it was, 
God is powerless to impede its past existence. As Henry writes 
According to the Philosopher, a being that exists, when it exists exists necessarily, 
so that as long as it exists there is no power to make it not exist, neither on the 
part of the being itself, nor on the part of any efficient cause, since nothing has 
power to make contradictory things be simultaneously. And similarly concerning 
what was: for as long as it was, its having been is necessary.119 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q.7-8, 41: “Secundum Philosophum esse quod est, quando est, 
necessario est, ita quod pro tempore quo est, non st potentia ut non sit, neque ex parte ipsius entis neque ex 
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If a creature exists at t1, then even if God destroys it at t2, this does not make it not to 
have existed at t1. If a creature exists at t1, it will always have existed then. Thus if the 
world has existed from eternity, then its having existed at infinite past moments is still 
necessary today. No change that God effects today can eliminate the necessity whereby 
the world existed before today, if it has always existed.  
 But what if God is powerful enough to undo the past? In that case, even if the 
world has existed from eternity, God no longer created it necessarily. To show why not, 
let’s posit that before today the world has always existed. Nevertheless, if God can undo 
the past, then he could make the world not to have existed at any and every past moment. 
For example, God could now bring it about that there was no American Revolution, for 
he can make the events of July 4, 1776 never to have been. Thus even now the past 
existence of the world would not be necessary. Moreover, if God can make past events 
not to have been, he could have exercised that power on any day prior to today, which 
means that at no past moment has the world’s existence been necessary. At any past 
moment tx, God could have undone the world’s past existence at any time prior to tx, and 
thus rendered its existence at tx contingent. Simply put, if God can undo the past, then a 
possible eternal creation would in no way jeopardize God’s freedom in creating. In other 
words, Henry of Ghent’s principal argument against the possibility of a world from 
eternity fails.  
 Now our burden becomes showing that Gregory of Rimini in fact holds this view. 
It’s not entirely clear which if any of Gregory’s medieval predecessors affirmed the view 
that God has the power to undo the past. The claim that God can change the past is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
parte alicuius efficientis, quia super hoc nulla est potentia, quia esset ad contradictoria facere simul esse. Et 
similiter de eo quod fuit: pro tempore quod fuit, necessarium est fuisse.”   
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traditionally attributed to Peter Damian in his Letter on Divine Omnipotence, but 
scholarly opinion is divided in that regard.120 As Gaskin indicates, that God can make the 
past not to have been was by no means a popular position in the Middle Ages.121 Gregory 
broaches the question of whether God can undo the past in Lectura super primum 
(henceforth, LSP) d. 42-44, q.1, add.155.122 Admittedly, what Gregory says there is not 
unambiguous.123 Part of what I hope to show in chapter three is that what Gregory says 
later about the eternity of the world clarifies his views regarding God’s power to make a 
past event not to have been. In any case, according to W.J. Courtenay, to some extent the 
perceived ambiguity of Gregory’s position owes more to how scholars have viewed 
Gregory in relation to other fourteenth century figures than to what Gregory actually 
says.124  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 For example, Marenbon interprets Peter as affirming the logical impossibility of any agent undoing the 
past in the sense of making an event not to have happened after it has happened. After Rome comes to be, 
not even God can make it not to have existed (John Marenbon, “Philosophy and its Background in the 
Middle Ages”, in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John Marenbon [London: Routledge, 1998]: 112-113). In 
contrast, Gaskin argues that Peter isn’t bothered by the contradictions involved in God’s power to undo the 
past. Since God created the order in which the principle of non-contradiction holds, by his absolute power 
God can bring about contradictory things (Richard Gaskin, “Peter Damian on Divine Power and the 
Contingency of the Past,” British Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 [1997]: 234).      
121 Gaskin, “Peter Damian on Divine Power and the Contingency of the Past”, 229.   
122 Gregorius Ariminensis, OESA, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum: Tomus III, Super 
Primum (dist. 19-48), ed. A. Damasus Trapp et Venicio Marcolino (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), d.42-
45, q1, additio 155: “Tertia conclusio est quod quamlibet rem praeteritam potest deus facere non fuisse.”      
123 For example, at one point in d. 42-44, Gregory lists five argumenta contra tertiam conclusionem 
additionalem, i.e. against the conclusion that God can make a past event not to have been, which he then 
leaves unanswered (see Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super primum, d.42-44, q.1, 367). Naturally, some 
readers may interpret Gregory’s leaving arguments against the conclusion unanswered as uncertainty 
regarding God’s power to undo the past.   
124 Courtenay explains that before the mid-twentieth century, scholars typically viewed William of Ockham 
as a radical whose critical and skeptical views in metaphysics and epistemology destroyed the synthesis of 
faith and reason achieved in the latter thirteenth century. Scholars like Philotheus Boehner worked to 
correct this view, with the result that Ockham’s thought came to be viewed “as a continuation, and in some 
areas, a further refinement of thirteenth century thought rather than a rejection of past approaches.” One 
consequence of Ockham’s rehabilitation, however, has been that figures who disagreed with Ockham or the 
Ockhamists came to be seen as the true radicals. One of these figures is John of Mirecourt, who following 
lectures he gave at Paris in the academic year 1344-45, was accused and later condemned for having taught 
that God is able to undo the past. This involves Gregory inasmuch as A.D. Trapp has claimed that Gregory 
was one of the key figures associated with the condemnation of Mirecourt (“Augustinian Theology of the 
Fourteenth Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions, and Book-Lore”, Augustiniana 6 [1956]: 
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 For Gregory of Rimini, God is able to make a past event not to have been in virtue 
of his potentia absoluta. Since Courtenay regards Gregory’s explanation of the 
distinction between potentia Dei absoluta and potentia Dei ordinata as perhaps the 
clearest of all theologians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,125 let’s begin our 
exposition of Gregory’s position by examining his account of that distinction. First, 
Gregory is quick to say that potentia Dei absoluta and potentia Dei ordinata are not two 
separate powers in God.126 To posit two such powers would run the risk of compromising 
the truth of God’s simplicity. Instead, the distinction indicates that God’s power extends 
beyond what he eternally wills. In other words, while the potentia Dei ordinata is nothing 
other than God’s eternal, unchanging will, the potentia Dei absoluta signifies the endless 
worlds, things, and events God could have willed but doesn’t.127 While the potentia Dei 
ordinata exists actually and explains the world and all its positive features, the potentia 
Dei absoluta exists only in potentiality.   
Gregory puts flesh on this rather abstract distinction by means of the following 
example: 
Simply speaking, Christ was able not to become incarnate and not to die… and 
yet he was not able [not to become incarnate] while his order stood, whereby he 
eternally proposed through his death to redeem the human race. For these things 
are incompatible: “God proposed that he would die” and “God will not die”, 
referring to the same time. But although these are incompatible, still because the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146-274). Thus it is thought that since Mirecourt held that God could undo the past, and Gregory worked 
for his condemnation, Gregory could not have held that God could make a past event not to have been. As 
Courtenay shows, however, a close reading of Mirecourt’s First Apology and Lectura show that Mirecourt 
did not hold the view commonly ascribed to him. Moreover, Trapp’s evidence for Gregory’s involvement 
in the condemnation is tenuous (William J. Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on 
Whether God can Undo the Past,” Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 39 [1972]: 224-256; 40 
[1973]: 147-174).  
125 Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini,” 158.   
126 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super primuum Sententiarum, d.42-44, q.1, 368: “Non quod in deo sint 
duae potentiae, una ordinate, alia absoluta.” 
127 Ibid.: “Illud dicitur deus…posse de sua potentia ordinata, quod potest stante sua ordinatione et lege 
aeterna, quae non est aliud quam eius voluntas, qua aeternaliter voluit haec vel illa et taliter vel taliter se 
facturum, illud autem dicitur posse de potentia absoluta, quod simpliciter et absolute potest.” 
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ordering is not necessary…therefore, that which is only impossible by the 
supposition of the ordering, as incompatible with it, is not absolutely impossible, 
but possible, and simply speaking God is able to do it.128 
 
For Gregory, God’s absolute power transcends what one may know of it from any 
contingent, historical ordering God has instituted. Of course, even God’s absolute power 
is subject to the principle of non-contradiction, since God cannot at the same time 
propose that Christ not die and that Christ die for the salvation of the human race. 
Nevertheless, the order God has de facto willed, according to which human beings are 
free, and the death of God’s Incarnate Son was necessary to rectify humans’ abuse of 
their freedom, is contingent simpliciter. Therefore, Gregory notes that strictly speaking, 
i.e. according to God’s absolute power, the Son of God could have forgone the 
Incarnation – nothing compelled him to save human beings in this fashion or to save 
them at all, for that matter. Nevertheless, secundum quid, i.e. supposing God’s eternal 
decision to save the human race by means of his Son’s death, the Incarnation and Death 
of Christ are necessary. Since that necessity is relative to other decisions God has made, 
one must be careful not to confuse the “limits” of God’s power relative to the order God 
has willed with the limits of God’s omnipotence, simpliciter. In Gregory’s view the 
former set of limits are self-imposed by God.  
 As I already noted, even as he distinguishes God’s absolute and ordained power, 
Gregory admits that even God cannot posit an act that runs afoul of the principle of non-
contradiction. In fact, the principle challenge Gregory faces in convincing us that God 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Ibid.: “Constat quod simpliciter loquendo Christus potuit non incarnari et non mori…et tamen istud non 
poterat stante ordinatione sua, qua aeternaliter proposuit per suam mortem redimere genus humanum. Sunt 
enim haec incompossibilia ‘deus proposuit se moriturum’ and ‘deus non morietur’ referendo ad tempus 
idem. Quamvis autem ista sint incompossibilia, quia tamen illa ordinatio non est necessaria…ideo illud, 
quod solum est impossibile ex supposition ordinationis, utpote ei incompossibile, non est absolute 
impossibile, sed possibile, et simpliciter loquendo illud deus potest facere.”  
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can undo the past in virtue of his absolute power consists in showing there is no 
contradiction in causing a past event not to have occurred.129 Let’s look at some of the 
arguments whereby Gregory tries to prove that it does not involve a contradiction for God 
to undo the past. In the second argument Gregory advances to prove his thesis, he posits 
the counterfactual that  
God did not will to produce Adam; therefore, God did not produce Adam, and 
further, Adam was not. The consequences are necessary; and the first antecedent 
is possible, therefore also the last consequence. And further it follows: it is 
possible that Adam was not; therefore, God is able to make it that Adam was not. 
But that the first antecedent is possible, is proved, because everything God was 
able to will from eternity, he is now able to have willed from eternity, and 
because he was able not to will, he is able not to have willed. Therefore, although 
from eternity he willed to produce Adam, nevertheless he is able not to have 
willed, and can have willed not to produce, as even he was able from eternity.130 
 
The first part of the argument is straightforward enough: presuming God didn’t want 
Adam to exist, therefore Adam wasn’t. The conditional necessity of the both 
consequents, i.e. “God did not produce Adam” and “Adam was not” points to Adam’s 
contingency – his existence depends on God’s will. Gregory’s next move is more 
controversial, however. He constructs a syllogism, the antecedent of which is “it is 
possible that Adam was not.” It’s significant that Gregory uses the present tense of esse. 
Although the first syllogism proved that it was possible for Adam not to be, it is by no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Along with a host of medieval thinkers, Thomas Aquinas denies God can undo the past. At Summa 
theologiae I, q.25, a.4, he argues that making a past event not to have been involves a contradiction, since 
once a thing happens, its having happened will necessarily always be. In the same article, in the reply to the 
first objection, Aquinas compares undoing the past to raising the dead. He points out that raising the dead 
does not undo the past, since it’s still true that the now-living person once was dead. Though raising the 
dead is impossible for a natural power, it is not beyond God’s power. Undoing the past, since it involves a 
contradiction, surpasses even the power of God.  
130 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super primum Sententiarum, d.42-44, q.1, 362: “Deus non voluit Adam 
producere; igitur deus non produxit Adam, et ultra, igitur Adam non fuit. Consequentiae sunt necessariae; 
et primum antecedens est possibile, igitur et ultimum consequens. Et ultra sequitur: Possibile est Adam non 
fuisse; igitur deus potest facere quod Adam non fuerit. Quod autem primum antecedens est possibile, 
probatur, quia omne, quod deus potuit ab aeterno velle, potest nunc ab aeterno voluisse, et quod potuit non 
velle, potest non voluisse. Quamvis igitur ab aeterno voluerit producere Adam, potest tamen non voluisse, 
et potest voluisse non producere, sicut ab aeterno potuit.” 
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means self-evident that it is now possible for Adam not to have been. To prove the 
antecedent Gregory claims, “Everything God was able to will from eternity, he is now 
able to have willed from eternity.” This claim is interesting, to say the least, for it shows 
just how thick is Gregory’s notion of divine omnipotence.131  
 For Gregory, what God did vis-à-vis creatures yesterday in no way limits his 
power today. Gregory’s claim that “everything God was able to will from eternity, he is 
now able to have willed from eternity,” reveals that his theory of divine omnipotence is 
connected to his views with respect to divine immutability: since before God willed to 
create Adam, he was able not to will to create Adam, and God’s power (which is identical 
with God) is immutable, then even after God created Adam, he remains eternally able not 
to have willed Adam. Being able to will x (or, alternatively, not to will x) belongs to 
God’s immutable essence, such that even after God posits an act of his will, resulting in 
the existence of x, God can still will (and so bring it about) that x has never existed. 
Naturally, understanding Gregory’s argument requires us to appreciate the distinction 
between God’s ordained and absolute power. Gregory doesn’t think there is any risk of 
God destroying Adam’s past existence. God has created an order in which the past does 
not cease to be past. Nevertheless, that order is not the only one God could have created, 
and since God retains now the same prerogatives he has had from eternity, e.g. to will 
that Adam never was, even now God can will that Adam never was.   
  Next, Gregory elaborates on his point with another example. He writes, 
“Moreover, even though [God] willed from eternity to produce the Antichrist, still he is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Most medieval thinkers, e.g. Henry of Ghent, Peter Auriol, and William of Ockham, argue that although 
the “past-ness” of a past event is only conditionally necessary, it is still necessary. For example, although 
Adam’s existence is not necessary simpliciter – God could have willed not to produce him – after God 
produced Adam, God’s power is limited as a result of that decision. Although God may stop causing Adam 
to exist, God cannot make it so that Adam never was. 
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able never to have willed to produce [the Antichrist], and it is not less possible for him 
never to have willed to produce Adam than the Antichrist.”132 Here the argument is 
similar to what we saw above: God has eternally willed to produce the Antichrist; but this 
act of God’s will is not identical with God’s essence – willing the existence of Antichrist 
is not part and parcel of being God. On the other hand, the power either to will or not to 
will the Antichrist pertains to God’s essence. Since God’s de facto willing of the 
Antichrist does not change God, it is still possible for him never to have willed the 
Antichrist. Then an objection is raised: God’s ability to cause Adam not to have been, on 
the one hand, and God’s ability never to produce the Antichrist, on the other, are not of 
the same order, since while Adam has already been, the Antichrist hasn’t yet existed. 
Adam’s past existence is conditionally necessary, while the Antichrist is a future 
contingent being. Therefore, that God can undo the past and that he can impede the future 
are substantially different claims.133  
Thus Gregory’s task is to show that past and future events are equally contingent. 
Moreover, he also still has to settle the issue of whether undoing the past involves a 
contradiction. How can something that has happened be made not to have happened? 
Would such an eventuality amount to making something both to have happened and not 
to have happened? Gregory attempts to answer both objections in the following text, in 
which he seeks to explain under what circumstances it would be impossible for God not 
to have willed to produce Adam: 
If it were impossible that God didn’t will to produce Adam, this would not be 
because he produced Adam, but because he willed to produce [Adam] and it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super primum Sententiarum, d.42-44, q.1, 362: “Item, non obstante 
quod ab aeterno voluit producere Antichristum, adhuc potest numquam voluisse producere, et non minus 
est sibi possibile numquam voluisse producere Adam quam Antichristum.”  
133 Ibid.  
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necessary that he willed. Because, grant per impossibile that it is necessary that he 
produced, and nevertheless it is not necessary that he willed to produce, still it 
will be possible that he did not will to produce. But it is established that it is not 
less true that God willed from eternity to produce the Antichrist than that he 
willed to produce Adam. Therefore, as the one is contingent, so is the other.134   
 
Under what circumstances would it be impossible for God today not to have willed to 
produce Adam? Gregory claims that, if God is unable today not to have willed to produce 
Adam, it’s not because God already produced him. Instead, it would be impossible only 
if, subsequent to God’s having willed to produce him, it were still necessary for him to 
have thus willed. In other words, the impossibility requires that in virtue of God willing 
to produce Adam at t1, God would necessarily will that at t2, t3, t4, etc., Adam was 
produced at t1. For Gregory, this cannot be the case. Now, of course, if God wills to 
produce Adam at t1, it is impossible that he should not will to produce Adam at t1, since 
according to the principle of non-contradiction, something cannot be both be and not be 
at the same time and in the same respect. But the conditional necessity of God’s willing 
to produce Adam at t1 does not perdure subsequently. If God wills to produce Adam at tx, 
he can will that Adam shall never have been at a later moment ty. Since tx and ty are not 
simultaneous, there is no logical conflict in any of this.135  
To drive the point home, Gregory posits a counterfactual: for the sake of 
argument, grant that it is necessary that God produced Adam. Even in that case, Gregory 
argues, “it is not necessary that he willed to produce [Adam].” On my reading, Gregory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Ibid., 362-363: “Si impossibile esset deum non voluisse producere Adam, hoc non esset, quia produxit 
Adam, sed quia voluit producere et necesse esset ipsum voluisse, quia, da per impossibile quod necesse sit 
ipsum produxisse, et tamen non sit necesse ipsum voluisse producere, adhuc erit possibile ipsum non 
voluisse producere. Sed constat quod non est minus verum deum ab aeterno voluisse producere 
Antichristum quam voluisse producere Adam. Sicut igitur illud est contingens, ita est istud.” 
135 In other words, as Gaskin argues (“Peter Damian on Divine Power and the Contingency of the Past”, 
234) apropos of Peter Damian’s discussion, for Gregory, “Power over the past, if God had it, would be the 
power, given Pp [that some event p occurred in the past], to bring about not – Pp, not in the composed 
sense (i.e. not – Pp as well as Pp), but in the divided sense (i.e. not – Pp instead of Pp).   
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means that for God to do something when God does not will to do it involves no per se 
contradiction. Though such a scenario may be absurd for other reasons, there is nothing 
contradictory about a being performing an operation while at the time not willing to do 
so. Thus a fortiori there is no contradiction in saying that God, after willing to produce, 
wills that Adam never was. Of course, God is atemporal - his acts of willing do not 
temporally succeed one another – so we need to rephrase the scenario Gregory is 
proposing to accommodate God’s atemporality. I take Gregory to mean that it is possible 
for God, in a single eternal act of willing, to will that Adam is produced at tx and that at 
some later moment ty Adam shall never have existed. Furthermore, since Gregory regards 
this scenario as involving no contradiction, the past production of Adam and the future 
production of the Antichrist remain equally contingent events. Although God wills both 
from eternity, since his will may stipulate that what has come about will later never have 
been, a future event is no more contingent than a past one. 
It is not clear that Gregrory argues convincingly that the power he attributes to 
God over the past does not violate the principle of non-contradiction. For the sake of 
argument, let’s concede Gregory’s point that God’s power to undo the past does not 
imply a contradiction arising in time. After all, Gregory thinks that, in the event God does 
undo some feature of the past, that feature would not have been and not have been at the 
same moment tx. Nevertheless, doesn’t Gregory’s view imply that there is a contradiction 
in God’s eternity? If I have interpreted Gregory correctly as claiming that “in a single 
eternal act of willing,” God can “will that Adam is produced at tx and that at some later 
moment ty Adam shall not have existed at tx,” doesn’t this mean that God eternally wills 
both to produce Adam at tx and not to produce him then? Luckily, for our purposes it’s 
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not necessary to answer these questions. What is important for this study, and what I 
hope to have shown, is that Gregory attributes to God the power to render a past event not 
past. Gregory’s views about God’s power over the past (even if he hasn’t convinced us 
that God has such power) permit him respond to Henry of Ghent in a way not open to 
Ockham.      
Having shown that Gregory does advocate for God’s ability to undo the past, we 
proceed to connect the argument of LSP, d.42-44, q.1, to LSS, d.1, q.3, Gregory’s 
treatment of the possibility of an eternal creation. Recall that the primary concern of our 
study is how Gregory’s question on the eternity of the world answers Henry of Ghent’s 
“necessary creation argument.” Significantly, the counterfactual Gregory posits in order 
to show that Adam’s past existence remains contingent involves God creating Adam 
necessarily. As we’ve seen, Gregory’s purpose for the counterfactual is to show that 
Adam’s past existence is every bit as contingent as a future event. This has important 
implications for our study of Gregory’s contribution to the eternity of the world debate. 
The “necessary creation argument”, both in its original version in Henry, and as repeated 
by Auriol and Ockham, claims that an eternal world implies a necessary creation. This is 
bothersome, since a necessary creation implies that God’s will is under compulsion to 
create. However, Gregory’s argument at LSP, d.42-44, q.1 has attempted to establish that 
God remains free to undo the past existence of his effects. Therefore, neither does the 
endless past existence of the whole world restrict God’s will from willing that it not be 
past.  
Shortly after explaining under what circumstances it would be impossible for God 
not to have willed to produce Adam, Gregory tells us that God’s power to undo the past 
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will be touched upon again in book II of the Lectura.136 It should be no surprise to us that 
the portion of LSS to which Gregory directs is none of than d. 1, q.3, the question on the 
eternity of the world. Thus, in the final section of chapter three we return to that text, in 
order to show how Gregory’s account of God’s ability to undo the past influences his 
argumentation on behalf of the possibility of an eternal creation. At LSS, d.1, q.3, the first 
and most manifest allusion to God’s power to undo the past comes in the quarta 
conclusio of article one. Gregory writes 
A fourth conclusion can probably be posited, if it is held that the past can not have 
been through divine power, as some teachers have held and some still hold, as 
was touched upon in Book I, dist. 42, q.1. And that fourth conclusion (which, 
nevertheless, I do not assert) would be: That it is possible even now that 
something other than God has been from eternity, and I speak always concerning 
God’s absolute power.137   
 
Initially, one is struck by the tentativeness with which Gregory proposes the fourth 
conclusion. He insists that he is not asserting it, but only that it “can probably be 
posited.” Gregory’s hesitation in this passage is all the stranger given that the quarta 
conclusio is the the terminus ad quem of the preceding conclusions Gregory proposes in 
d.1, q.3, a.1. So how does one explain the way Gregory distances himself from this 
important thesis?  
 On account of political developments at the University of Paris after Gregory 
lectured on the Sentences but before the Lectura was published, it must have appeared 
prudent to him not to own the fourth conclusion too strongly. On the basis of a few pieces 
of evidence (including a 12 January 1345 letter of Clement VI requesting that Gregory be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super primum Sententiarum, d.42-44, q.1, 364. 
137 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum Sententiarum, d.1, q.3, a.1, 104: “Quarta conclusio 
posset probabiliter poni, si teneretur quod praeteritum potest per divinam potentiam non fuisse, sicut aliqui 
doctores tenuerunt et adhuc aliqui tenent, ut in Primo distinctione 42 quaestione 1 tactum est. Et esset 
conclusio ista quarta quam tamen non assero: Quod possibile est nunc etiam aliquam aliam rem a deo fuisse 
ab aeterno, et loquor semper de potentia dei absoluta.”   
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promoted to Magister at Paris), Chris Schabel thinks Gregory lectured on the Sentences 
in 1343-44, but that he remained in Paris revising the Lectura until late 1346, by which 
time he was back in Rimini.138 As Courtenay has already brought to our attention, John of 
Mirecourt lectured on the Sentences the year after Gregory, and his views regarding 
God’s power to undo the past drew considerable fire from other members of the 
Theology faculty, finally leading to a condemnation issued by the Chancellor Robert de 
Bardis in 1347.139 Given that the prosecution of Mirecourt must have occurred during the 
time Gregory was revising the Lectura for publication, and the fourth conclusion relies on 
the notion that God can undo the past, it’s understandable that Gregory would only 
rehearse (and not assert) the fourth conclusion.  
 Nevertheless, Gregory proposes, albeit meekly, that even now God through his 
absolute power can cause the world to have been from eternity. How does he prove it? He 
writes, “From eternity God can have willed to make A…Therefore God can [potest] have 
made A from eternity.” Proving the consequent of this little argument is simple, for if 
God cannot make from eternity what he has willed from eternity, his will is not 
omnipotent. Since God is omnipotent, the consequent is clear.140 The truth of the 
antecedent (“From eternity God can have willed to make A”) is not so evident. Notice 
that Gregory does not say, “From eternity God could have willed to make A [potuit 
voluisse facere A].” He had already proven that view in the third conclusion. Instead, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Schabel, Christopher. “Gregory of Rimini.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford 
University, 1997-. Article published September 2, 2007. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/gregory-rimini/. 
139 As Courtenay argues (“John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini,” 236), Mirecourt himself did not hold 
that God can undo the past. It seems instead that the theological commission that tried Mirecourt issued the 
condemnation because he did not oppose sufficiently strongly the view that God can undo the past (256).    
140 Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super secundum Sententiarum, d.1, q.3, a.1, 107: “Patet consequentia, 
quia sequitur: Deus voluit ab aeterno fecisse A, igitur deus ab aeterno fecit A. Alias sua voluntas non 
fuisset omnipotens.”  
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antecedent claims that, even though God did not make A from eternity (after all, 
Christians know from divine Revelation that God created the world in time), even now he 
still can. In other words, God can undo his past work to make a world that always has 
been.  
To grasp meaning of the antecedent, we have to know the precise significance of 
the phrase facere (or producere) ab aeterno. Just a little later in the same question, 
Gregory unpacks the meaning of this phrase, when he says, “‘To have made from 
eternity’ is not to have produced first in any eternal instant, but it is to have produced 
before any finite time [ante quodlibet tempus finitum], actual or possible or imaginable. 
From this it is manifestly denied that there was any such first eternal instant.”141 Gregory 
explains that “creation from eternity” does not signify creation in an instant before time 
taken as a whole. Instead, the phrase signifies that God creates before any or whatever 
time (ante quodlibet tempus). In other words, events occurring at t1, t2, t3... are each 
immediately caused by God. For Gregory, God’s creative activity works something like 
the following mathematical expression: 
3(2 + 6 + 7) 
As any third-grader knows, to calculate the numerical value of the expression, she needs 
to distribute 3 to all three numbers inside the parentheses: 
3(2) + 3(6) + 3(7) 
When Gregory says that God creates ante quodlibet tempus, he means that God 
distributes his power through time such that it precedes each temporal event taken 
individually, just as 3 is distributed individually to each number within the parentheses. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Ibid.,109: “‘Ab aeterno produxisse’ non est produxisse primo in aliquo instanti aeterno, sed est ante 
quodlibet tempus finitum actuale vel possibile vel imaginabile produxisse. Ex quo manifeste negatur fuisse 
aliquod tale primum instans aeternum.” 
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Gregory denies that God created the world in a “first eternal instant.” On the contrary, 
God creates every temporal thing or event immediately. Since God distributes his 
creative power in this way, i.e. immediately before each temporal event, there is no 
philosophical reason why that “distribution” could not have taken place from an endless 
past. Thus the meaning of the antecedent, “From eternity God can have willed to make 
A,” is: “Even though God didn’t create A before any finite time (actual, possible, or 
imaginary), he still can even now.”  
Unsurprisingly, in support of the antecedent Gregory quotes the same text from 
Sentences I, d.43, which he had earlier given as evidence that God is able to undo the 
past. In that passage Gregory quoted the Lombard as saying that God “has the power of 
willing both now and from eternity, what nevertheless he does not now will, nor willed 
from eternity.”142 For Gregory, since God could have produced something other than 
himself from eternity (the third conclusion of article 1), but he could have produced 
nothing except by willing, then God could have willed to produce A from eternity. 
Moreover, as we saw from the discussion of God’s power to undo the past, for Gregory 
God’s past creaturely effects do not limit his power vis-à-vis creatures today. God’s 
creating doesn’t diminish his omnipotence in any way. Therefore, though God did not 
create the world from eternity, he could have, and thus still can now.  
Gregory’s claim that God’s omipotence extends so far as to be able even now to 
create a world from eternity is critical for our account of how his question on the eternity 
of the world answers Henry of Ghent and fills a gap left by Ockham. For Ockham, there 
was no purely philosophical answer to Henry’s “necessary creation argument.” But this is 
precisely what Gregory’s application of his views about God’s power to undo the past to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Ibid., 107. 
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the question of the eternity of the world offers us. Simply put, Gregory’s fourth 
conclusion shows us that the possibility of a world from eternity does not compromise 
God’s freedom in the act of creating. If God can even now render “not past” his having 
created the world in time and instead  produce a world from eternity, then in the event 
that God had created a world from eternity, he could likewise undo the past to create a 
world that began in time. Contrary to what Henry of Ghent, Peter Auriol, and William of 
Ockham all thought, if there had been no instant “before” God created the world, the 
world’s existence would be nonetheless contingent, since at any instant (including the 
present) God was free to make the world’s past existence not to have been.  
Other passages of LSS d.1, q.3 give strong evidence of the relevance of Gregory’s 
views on God’s power to cancel the past for his position regarding the possibility of an 
eternal world. For example, in article 1 Gregory confronts the following objection: 
If God could produce B from eternity, he could produce B from eternity either 
before he produced B, or when he first produced B, or after he produced B: Let B 
be some singular produced new by God… It cannot be said that he could before, 
because then it follows that he could in some instant before he could. But this 
consequent is impossible, since then in this instant he was able to do the same 
thing, sc. produce B from eternity. Neither can it be said that then when he 
produced, because, let that instant be grasped and let it be the present instant, it 
follows that now God can have produced B from eternity, which is false: then 
because this cannot be through any sudden or successive action. Then because 
God cannot now make it so that the past did not exist, therefore neither can he 
make it so that “what was not the past before A” is the past before A. And for the 
same reason it is clear that not after he produced B, could he produce it from 
eternity.143 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Ibid., 102: “Si deus potuit B producere ab aeterno, aut antequam produxit B, potuit producere B ab 
aeterno; aut quando primo produxit B, potuit, etc; aut postquam produxit B, potuit etc: Sit B aliquod 
singulare de novo productum a deo…Non potest dici quod ante, quia tunc sequitur quod in aliquo instanti 
ante potuit. Hoc autem consequens est impossibile, quia tunc in hoc instanti posset idem facere scilicet 
producere B ab aeterno. Nec potest dici quod tunc, quando produxit, quia, accipiatur illud instans et sit 
instans praesens, sequitur quod nunc potest deus produxisse B ab aeterno, quod est falsum: Tum quia hoc 
non potest per actionem aliquam subitam neque successivam. Tum quia deus non potest nunc facere 
praeteritum non fuisse, igitur nec potest facere ‘non praeteritum ante A’ fuisse ante A. Et per idem patet 
quod non postquam produxit B, potuit ipsum producere ab aeterno.” 
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This objection is strikingly similar to Henry of Ghent’s argument without the 
consequence that God must have created the world necessarily. Gregory posits that God 
created B de novo, i.e. at some instant B was new. Now if God could create B from 
eternity, he would have to create it before, when, or after he in fact created B: not before, 
since what begins to exist before one instant necessarily begins in another (albeit earlier) 
instant, which implies that it is not from eternity. Again,  God could not have produced B 
from eternity when he produced it, because nothing that begins in any instant “when” is 
from eternity. Finally, not after he created it, since that would require something 
impossible, namely, that God cancels the past, according to which B begins to exist de 
novo in time. This argument is compelling for the same reason as Henry’s “necessary 
creation argument”: both arguments challenge us to locate an instant in which God could 
have created the world from eternity, and both conclude that no such instant possibly 
exists. While Henry’s argument concludes that if God created the world from eternity, 
there was no instant when God worked freely, the upshot of the present argument is that 
the world was created in an instant, and since no instant is from eternity, God could not 
have produced the world from eternity.  
 In his answer to the argument, Gregory admits it’s the most difficult of the fifteen 
he entertains in this question.144 He then argues that if one accepts the fourth conclusion 
posited above, i.e. “That what wasn’t can have been through divine power,” then “It must 
be said that before he produced B, when he produced, and similarly after, he could have 
produced [B] from eternity; and it must be conceded that even now he can have produced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Ibid., 116: “Ad quartum decimum, quod pro certo inter omnia est difficilius meo iudicio…” 
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from eternity.”145 Interestingly, as we noted above with respect to Gregory’s criticism of 
some of Auriol’s arguments against the possibility of a world from eternity, Gregory’s 
answer to the above argument does not contest its key premise that the world was created 
in an instant. Instead, Gregory meets the argument on the objector’s terms. He admits for 
the sake of argument that the world was created in an instant, but argues that if God can 
undo the past, then at any instant relative to when he produced the world (antequam, 
quando, postquam), God can have created the world from eternity. For example, let’s 
posit that the universe begin 100 billion years ago, implying that there was a considerable 
incubation period before the “Big Bang” occurred merely 14 billion years ago. For 
Gregory, in virtue of God’s absolute power, today God can cancel the void that preceded 
the universe’s production, such that 100 billion years ago the world had already existed 
from eternity. At the conclusion of his answer, Gregory remarks, “Let the one who 
doesn’t like this answer find one better.”146 
 Finally, then, let’s review the course of the this chapter’s argument. First, we 
explained how Henry’s necessary creation argument is premised on the absolute 
necessity of the past as past, such that if the past were contingent even according to 
God’s potentia ordinata, Henry’s argument would no longer succeed. In fact, it was 
Ockham’s agreement with Henry’s view that the past is absolutely necessary as past that 
kept him from seeing a way around the purported logical connection between a world 
from eternity and a necessary creation. Then I argued that for Gregory, although 
according to the order God has instituted, the past is necessary as past, God is able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Ibid.: “Si teneretur quarta conclusio supra posita scilicet quod illud quod non fuit, potest per divinam 
potentiam fuisse, tunc esset dicendum quod, et antequam produxit B et quando produxit et similiter post, 
potuit ipsum produxisse ab aeterno; et concedendum quod etiam nunc potest produxisse ab aeterno.” 
146 Ibid.: “Cui non placet haec responsio, procuret meliorem.” 
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undo the past by his potentia absoluta. Since Gregory is not saying that God praeterito 
supposito can make the past not to have been, for him no contradiction arises in God’s 
undoing the past. Thus a past event is every bit as contingent as a future event. Finally, 
we noted how Gregory applies the argument of LSP d.42-44, q.1 to LSS d.1, q.3. Since a 
key premise of Henry’s necessary creation argument doesn’t hold, i.e. that the past as 
past is absolutely necessary, in the event that God had created the world from eternity, at 
any time he could make the world’s eternal past existence not to have been. Therefore, an 
eternal creation does not imply that God created the world necessarily. In sum, by 
showing how God could freely produce a world from eternity, Gregory has filled in a 
significant gap left by Ockham. 
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Conclusion 
Finally, I wish to conclude my work by explaining what I think this thesis has 
achieved. Although its topic has been the eternity of the world in Gregory of Rimini, the 
thesis has logged (albeit partially) the developing importance of a single medieval 
argument against the possibility of an eternal creation, namely Henry of Ghent’s 
“necessary creation argument.” We’ve followed how three medieval thinkers spanning a 
period of about seventy years have answered Henry’s argument. I’ve tried to show that 
one can appreciate Gregory of Rimini’s contribution to the eternity of the world debate 
only if one recognizes how Gregory answers Henry (his remote interlocutor) by 
correcting and developing the answers of Peter Auriol and William of Ockham (his more 
proximate interlocutors).  
An important, though unsurprising achievement of this thesis is the way it shows 
the intersection of a few important debates at Paris in the first half of the fourteenth 
century. Although in 1277 Etienne Tempier condemned the proposition that an eternal 
world is possible, theologians and philosophers continued to debate the issue. As was the 
case even before the condemnation of 1277, the debate over the eternity of the world in 
the first half of the 1400’s was entangled with other important questions of the day. This 
thesis has touched upon two of them: first, the question (beloved of ancient philosophers) 
of whether spatial and temporal continua are composed of indivisible units. Though in 
fact Henry of Ghent was no atomist, his “necessary creation argument” implied a form of 
temporal atomism, a feature that emerged clearly in Peter Auriol’s arguments against the 
possibility of an eternal creation. In his Lectura on the Sentences, Gregory of Rimini 
argued that magnitudes and temporal continua, even when completely divided, still 
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include infinite parts, which themselves each contain infinite parts. I hope to have shown 
that Gregory’s account of the composition of continua permits him to correct Auriol’s 
view that creation necessarily occurred in an indivisible instant. For Gregory, since even 
an instant includes infinite proportional parts and thus no first part, there is no purely 
philosophical reason that the whole of time cannot span infinite days without any one day 
being first.  
Secondly, I have been at pains show the import of the debate over God’s power to 
undo the past for Gregory’s question on the eternity of the world. Ockham agreed with 
Henry that an eternal creation implies creation by necessity partly because he thought 
Henry was correct that even God cannot change the past. For that reason, although his 
philosophical argumentation merits a strong conclusion, Ockham did not say that a world 
from eternity is philosophically possible (period!). In the wake of Henry’s necessary 
creation argument, arguing for the philosophical possibility of an eternal creation 
required reconciling the eternity of the world with God’s freedom in creating. This is 
what Gregory tried to accomplish in arguing that God can undo the past. Even if we’re 
not entirely convinced by Gregory’s argument in that regard, we must admit that 
attempting to safeguard divine freedom in this way represents a genuinely new feature of 
the debate about the eternity of the world. I know of no other figure who adopts that 
strategy to answer Henry.   
Most importantly, however, this study has illustrated the developing realtionship 
between theological and philosophical thinking in the first half of the fourteenth century. 
Interestingly, the distance between philosophy and theology grew because theologians 
like Henry of Ghent and Peter Auriol smuggled properly theological principles, i.e. 
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principles derived from divine Revelation, into their otherwise philosophical arguments. 
If one studies earlier contributions to the eternity of the world debate, one sees that the 
explict appeal of fourteenth century thinkers to principles of faith was a novelty. For 
example, consider the arguments of Bonaventure against the possibility of a world from 
eternity. Ostensibly, Bonaventure was the intellectual lodestar of those opposing the 
possibility of an eternal creation. In the question of his Sentences commentary devoted to 
the possibility of an eternal world, he makes six arguments against such a possibility, all 
of which are properly philosophical and founded on solidly Aristotelian principles. Five 
of the arguments concern the nature of the infinite and the absurdities which would arise 
in the event of a world from eternity.147 The sixth claims that a thing whose matter and 
form are produced out of nothing necessarily has a temporal start.148 Next, in the 
question’s respondeo, Bonaventure argues,  
To propose that the world is eternal or is eternally produced by positing that all 
things have been produced from nothing is entirely contrary to truth and reason, 
as the last argument proves; and it is so contrary to reason, that I don’t believe any 
philosopher, no matter how little his intelligence, has posited this.149 
 
Bonaventure regards it as logically contradictory to claim that something created ex 
nihilo has always existed. Perhaps indulging in a bit of rhetorical hyperbole, he claims  
the contradiction entailed in the possibility of a world from eternity has been clear to all 
philosophers. The crucial point is that Bonaventure (whether correctly or incorrectly) 
opposed the possibility of an eternal creation on purely philosophical grounds. Though he 
must have been pleased that what he regarded as philosophical truth corresponded to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 For example, Bonaventure’s second argument states that there is no order among what is numerically 
infinite. This is on account of the fact that any order requires that there be a first. If the earth’s revolutions 
are infinite in number, then there was no first revolution and thus the cosmos lacks order, which is false, 
etc., (see Bonaventura, In secundum librum Sententiarum, d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2, 20-22).   
148 Ibid., 22.  
149 Ibid.  
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doctrine of supernatural Revelation, his contribution to the eternity of the world debate 
shows a respect for the difference between natural and revealed starting points.  
 Our study of the developing importance of the “necessary creation argument” has 
revealed that, at least by the time of Henry of Ghent, medieval theologians were not all as 
careful as Bonaventure about distinguishing between theological arguments founded on 
revealed principles, and philosophical arguments founded on natural ones. For example, 
we’ve seen that Henry claims it is possible to prove the world’s temporal beginning when 
certain things are supposed which right reason must suppose.150 Statements like this give 
the impression that a divinely revealed truth, i.e. that the world had a temporal start, is 
also knowable by natural reason apart from faith. Nevertheless, we observed that 
immediately after making the necessary creation argument, Henry dismisses the 
possibility of an eternal (and thus necessary) creation on the ground that faith holds the 
opposite: if the world exists necessarily, then it has never acquired being de novo from 
God, and this is contrary to faith, therefore, etc. Although Henry claims to be able to 
prove philosophically a doctrine that also belongs to supernatural faith, he smuggles in 
revealed premises when adequate philosophical arguments appear to be lacking. One 
wonders whether his approach to the question of an eternal creation is philosophical, 
theological, or a mix of both.  
We observed a similarly confusing methodology in the way Peter Auriol explains 
his agreement with Henry that the necessary creation argument gives us reason to reject 
the possibility of an eternal creation. Instead, Auriol argues, God created the world in an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q.7-8, 34: “Quod autem non possit probari creaturam incepisse 
secundum modum quo ponebant philosophi creaturae naturam et eam habere esse a Deo, bene verum est et 
in hoc concordant dicta exempla sanctorum. Probare autem eam incepisse secundum modum quo ponunt 
catholici naturam et eam habere esse a Deo, bene est possibile, suppositis quibusdam quae recta ratione 
supponenda sunt, ut iam videbitur.”  
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instant lacking duration. To ground this claim, Auriol makes two related arguments: first, 
if the vis productionis could conserve the world after the world’s initial instant, then the 
world could exist without an agent conserving it, which is contrary to faith. Second, if the 
vis productionis could conserve the world after the world’s initial instant, God would not 
be free to destroy the world he had created. This too, Auriol notes, is contrary to faith. As 
these examples prove, Auriol’s agreement with Henry that an eternal world would exist 
necessarily, and with it his rejection of the possibility of an eternal world, rest ultimately 
on revealed principles. This is not to deny that Henry’s necessary creation argument and 
Auriol’s explanation of his agreement with it are not in some respects genuinely 
philosophical. Their arguments do count as philosophy inasmuch as they aim to establish 
a logical connection between a hypothetical eternal creation and limits on God’s freedom. 
However, in the positions of Henry and Auriol regarding the possibility of a world from 
eternity, one distinguishes philosophical arguments from theological ones only with 
difficulty. Thus there are manifest differences between the methodology of Bonaventure, 
on the one hand, and that of Henry and Auriol, on the other.  
One does not find this sort of sloppy relatioship between philosophy and theology 
in William of Ockham’s arguments concerning the eternity of the world. As our reading 
of Ockham’s question has tried to show, Ockham approaches the question as a 
philosopher. After the confused methodologies of thinkers like Henry and Auriol, 
Ockham redraws the boundaries between philosophy and theology. We observed, for 
instance, that Ockham rejects Henry’s view that God’s creation and conservation of the 
world are necessary distinct. Ockham reminds Henry that this distinction derives from 
divine Revelation. As a philosopher, Ockham inclines to the view that an eternal creation 
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is possible. What’s more, thanks to Henry’s argument that if the world exists from 
eternity, qua philosopher Ockham is inclined to adopt a position similar to that of 
Avicenna, i.e. that the world can exist from eternity even though this seems to conflict 
with God’s freedom in creating. Nevertheless, as a Christian theologian he recognizes (à 
la Boethius of Dacia) that even as a philosopher he cannot assert to be true simpliciter 
what is contrary to the revealed truth of Christian faith. Therefore, despite all the strength 
of his philosophical argumentation (including effective responses to the difficult 
arguments concerning infinitae animae rationales and pars maior toti), Ockham 
concludes that one may reasonably hold either that a world from eternity is possible or 
that it is impossible. Of course, after Ockham’s strong arguments in favor of such a 
possibility, one may ask what reason there is for holding that the world necessarily began 
in time. The answer is simple: given Henry of Ghent’s argument that an eternal world 
implies a necessary creation (an argument which Ockham finds convincing), Christian 
theologians, qua theologians, reasoning from revealed principles, must hold that the 
world could not have been from eternity. In sum, Christian faith does not directly inform 
Ockham’s question on the eternity of the world, but it keeps Ockham the philosopher 
from asserting his views simpliciter.  
So the following narrative has arisen: although mid-thirteenth century opponents 
of the eternity of the world, e.g. Bonaventure, made do with purely philosophical 
arguments, beginning with Henry philosophical arguments didn’t seem to suffice. 
Instead, Henry and Auriol employ arguments that mix philosophical and theological 
principles to demonstrate the impossibility of a world from eternity. Next, perhaps in 
reaction to arguments like those of Auriol, Ockham proceeds to treat the issue again from 
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a purely philosophical point of view, this time with results quite different from those of 
Bonaventure. So the stage is set for Gregory of Rimini: on the one hand, in contrast to 
thinkers like Henry and Auriol, he wants to argue on the basis of philosophical principles 
alone. Nevetheless, like Henry and Auriol, he is eager to safeguard God’s freedom, albeit 
not on the basis of revealed principles. In this way he distinguishes himself from 
Ockham, who fails to offer a philosophical defense of God’s freedom in creating. Thus in  
Gregory of Rimini’s contribution to the debate, we see a next step in the evolving 
relationship between theology and philosophy. To be sure, Gregory is a theologian. He 
does not separate philosophy and theology in such a way as to permit philosophical 
reason to operate completely independently of the data of Christian faith. We found a 
good example of that in the way Gregory answers Henry’s argument partially by making 
a philosophical argument for God’s power to make a past event not to have been. In this 
way, Gregory succeeds in arguing for the possibility of an eternal creation (like Ockham), 
while also maintaining the doctrine of God’s freedom in creating (like Henry and Auriol). 
Yet, ironically, it’s possible that Gregory’s work of philosophically defending the notion 
of divine freedom, an aspect of revealed truth, paved the way for philosophy to operate 
with greater independence vis-à-vis theology.  
To explain what I mean, it’s necessary to highlight a puzzling aspect of the 
medieval eternity of the world debate: As we noticed earlier, Henry of Ghent and Peter 
Auriol both reject the possibility of an eternal creation on the grounds that it implies what 
is contrary to faith, i.e. the necessity of creation. Isn’t that unusual? If revealed principles 
are the criterion for judging the reasonableness of philosophical conclusions, why not 
reject the eternity of the world tout court as itself contrary to faith? Why discuss the 
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eternity of the world at all? In some ways, desire of thinkers like Henry and Auriol to 
safeguard Christian faith would have been better served by such an immediate rejection 
of the possibility of an eternal creation than by a methodology that confused theological 
and philosophical thinking. When these thinkers entertained the possibility of a world 
from eternity, and (unlike Bonaventure) managed to reject it only on theological grounds, 
they implicitly issued a challenge to thinkers like Ockham and Gregory to find 
philosophical reasons why the eternity of the world, in fact, does not imply that God 
created the world necessarily. In other words, they challenged their successors to expose 
the weaknesses of arguments grounded on theological principles. Although Ockham did 
not fulfill this challenge, Gregory makes a respectable (if not completely satisfying) 
attempt when he argues for God’s ability to undo the past and applies his views on that 
question to the eternity of the world controversy. So in the wake of Gregory’s 
intervention in the debate, not only are the partisans of a necessary temporal beginning to 
the world left without solid philosophical grounds for their position (thanks to thinkers 
like Ockham), but one of their traditional “faith-based” motives for rejecting a possible 
eternal world, i.e. the incompatibility of an eternal creation and God’s freedom, has 
likewise been in part philosophically discredited. It’s not difficult to imagine the effect 
such a development may have had on the subsequent relationship between medieval 
philosophy and theology: when thinkers like Gregory are able to diffuse philosophically 
the power of theological arguments against positions long held by Greek and Arab 
philosophers, it’s no wonder that the symbiotic relationship that prevailed between 
philosophy and theology in Europe in the Middle Ages began to disolve in favor of more 
independence for philosophy.      
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 By introducing revealed principles into what had been a philosophical debate, 
figures like Henry and Auriol render arguments based on revealed principles vulnerable 
to defeat by philosophical arguments. Naturally, when philosophical arguments are more 
convincing than those based upon revealed truth, philosophy asserts itself with new vigor. 
One begins to suspect that philosophical argumentation can answer all of one’s questions 
about the world. When theology transgresses its boundaries and invades what had been 
territory for philosophical thinking, the very place of theology within the intellectual life 
is theatened.   
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